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STRANGERS IN PARADISE: GRIGGS V. DUKE 
POWER CO. AND THE CONCEPT OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
Alfred W. Blumrosen* 
For good thoughts (though God accept them) yet towards men are 
little better than good dreams, except they be put in act; and that 
cannot be done without power and place, as the vantage and com-
manding ground.-Sir Francis Bacont 
I. PROLOGUE: THE OCCASION FOR A DECISION 
IN March 1966, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) negotiated an extensive agreement with the Newport 
News Shipyard to eliminate employment discrimination.1 The out-
come of these negotiations-which were conducted by the Office of 
Conciliations which I then headed-was the first major achievement 
for the EEOC under title Vll2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 Fol-
lowing that episode, Ken Holbert, Deputy Chief of Conciliations, 
and I decided to try to negotiate a model conciliation agreement on 
the subject of discriminatory employment testing. We knew that 
many companies had introduced tests in the 1950's and early 1960's 
• Professor of Law, Rutgers University. Chief of Conciliations, United States Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, 1965-1967. Consultant since 1967 to Depart-
ment of Labor, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of 
Justice, and EEOC. Executive Consultant to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, 
1972. B.A. 1950, J.D. 1953, University of Michigan.-Ed. The views expressed in this 
Article are those of the author and not necessarily those of any governmental agency. 
t Of Great Place, in FRANCIS BACON'S EssAYs 31-32 (Everyman's Library ed. 1906). 
1. See generally A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 328-407 (1971). 
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), 
prohibits discrimination in employment on grounds of race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin. It creates the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which 
is authorized to receive charges of discrimination, to investigate such charges, and where 
it has reasonable cause to believe a charge is true, to attempt to eliminate the alleged 
discriminatory employment practice by informal conciliation and persuasion. If concilia-
tion fails, the charging party is entitled to sue in federal district court. The process is 
described in M. SOVERN, LEGAL R.EsrRAlNTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
61-102 (1966). 
The Commission established an Office of Conciliations. From its creation until April 
1967, I served as Chief of that Office. Mr. Holbert was my deputy at the time. He 
later served as Acting Director of Compliance and Acting General Counsel. The work 
of the Office is described in A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 51-101. 
In March 1972, Congress amended title VII to enable the EEOC to sue private 
employers if conciliation failed. The Commission was also given jurisdiction over state 
and local government employment. Also, Congress designed the procedure so that the 
EEOC could not prevent an individual from suing. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. 
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
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when they could no longer legally restrict opportunities of blacks and 
other minority workers and that the tests had proved to be major 
barriers to minority advancement. We therefore sought to negotiate 
a solution that would induce industry either to stop using these tests, 
or, at the least, to modify their use so that they did not have a dis-
criminatory effect. 
Our attempt failed completely. We chose as the springboard for 
obtaining the model settlement a finding of the Commission that 
there was reasonable cause to believe a paper company in Louisiana 
had violated title VII,4 because the finding had mentioned the use of 
tests. However, when we attempted to negotiate on the testing issue, 
company officials pointed out that the reasonable-cause finding had 
merely alluded to the issue of employment tests. They maintained 
that their tests for general ability were important in enabling them 
to secure generally competent workers and that by using these tests, 
the company had developed a capable work force. They would not 
give up the tests unless compelled to do so. And we could not per-
suade the officials that title VII required the abandonment of these 
devices. 
As we flew back to Washington, we reflected on the setback we 
had just received. We concluded that further conciliation efforts con-
cerning testing would be useless unless the Commission published a 
clear official statement delineating what the law required. 'Without 
such official support, efforts at persuasion would fail because of the 
employer's intense interest in retaining his testing programs. We 
therefore decided to press within the EEOC for the adoption of 
guidelines that would resolve the legal questions concerning dis-
criminatory testing. We encouraged discussions within the Offices 
of Research and Compliance and the involvement of outside special-
ists in the testing field, and sought the opinion of the EEOC's Gen-
eral Counsel. The Commissioners and staff acted on our urging. As 
a result, the Commission issued its guidelines on employment testing 
on August 24, 1966.5 
4. Before the EEOC can begin conciliation proceedings, it must find that there is 
reasonable cause to believe a charge of discrimination is true. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) 
(1970), as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 
§ 4, 86 Stat. 104. The evolution of this procedure is described in A. BLUMROSEN, supra 
note I, at 43-47. 
5. The original guidelines were issued in a printed pamphlet. A brief excerpt appears 
at 35 U.S.L.W. 2137 (EEOC announcement, Aug. 24, 1966). A more detailed version 
of the guidelines was published on August 1, 1970, in the Federal Register. 35 Fed. 
Reg. 12333 (codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1972)). The original guidelines were 
developed in the Office of Research and Reports under the general supervision of its 
then director, Charles Markhem, and the direct supervision of its then Chief of Tech-
nical Studies, Phyllis Wallace. 
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The guidelines represented the EEOC's interpretation of section 
703(h)6 of title VII, which permits the use of a "professionally devel-
oped" ability test so long as that test is not "designed, intended or 
used" to discriminate. They rejected the position that the use of any 
test developed by a professional in the field of institutional or indus-
trial testing was protected under title VII and thus laid to rest one 
of the arguments presented by employers in conciliation conferences.7 
The guidelines also interpreted the phrase "professionally developed" 
to refer to tests measuring an employee's ability to perform the 
specific job or class of jobs for which he has applied, and thereby 
rejected the argument that an employer could test for "general 
ability or promotability."8 The remainder of the guidelines con-
stituted a Commission endorsement of contemporary psychological 
testing standards developed by professional associations. 
For those of us involved in title VII's administration, the guide-
lines provided the basis for a determination that certain testing prac-
tices were illegal. On this authority, our Office resumed efforts at 
conciliation. The case of the paper company in Louisiana was re-
examined by the Commission under the guidelines and a revised rea-
sonable-cause finding issued. This opinion was among the first 
published by the Commission and was later cited by the Supreme 
Court.9 Many other cases were processed under the guidelines. In 
some, attempts at conciliation were successful. When negotiations 
failed or were not undertaken because of the huge backlog of work 
at the Commission, suits were frequently brought in federal court 
under title VII, often with the litigation conducted by attorneys of 
the NAACP or the Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. 
One such case was Griggs v. Duke Power Co.10 It reached the 
6. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). 
7. The opening paragraph of the 1966 guidelines reads: 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that an employer may give 
and act upon the results of "any professionally developed ability test provided that 
such test ••• is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race ••• " 
(Sec. 703(h)). The language of the statute and its legislative history make it clear 
that tests may not be used as a device to exclude prospective employees on the 
basis of race. The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed 
ability tests" to mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required 
by the particular job or class of jobs which the applicant seeks, or which fairly 
affords the employer a chance to measure the applicant's ability to perform a 
particular job or class of jobs. The fact that a test was prepared by an individual 
or organization claiming expertise in test preparation does not, without more, 
justify its use within the meaning of Title VII. 
8. See note 7 supra. 
9. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 n.6 (1971). The Commission's opinion, 
with the parties' names deleted, appears in CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 1J 17,304.53 (EEOC 
Dec. 2, 1966) and is reprinted in Appendix A infra. 
10. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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Supreme Court and provided the first occasion for the high court to 
determine the nature and scope of the prohibition on racial dis-
crimination in employment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 
Although issued without fanfare, Griggs is in the tradition of the 
great cases of constitutional and tort law which announce and apply 
fundamental legal principles to the resolution of basic and difficult 
problems of human relationships. The decision has poured decisive 
content into a previously vacuous conception of human rights. It 
shapes the statutory concept of "discrimination" in light of the social 
and economic facts of our society. The decision restricts employers 
from translating the social and economic subjugation of minorities 
into a denial of employment opportunity, and makes practical a 
prompt and effective nationwide assault by both administrative agen-
cies and the courts on patterns of discrimination.12 
The assumption underlying Griggs is that the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 protects the interests of minority groups and their members in 
securing and improving employment opportunities. Griggs views 
discrimination not only as an isolated act by an aberrant individual 
wrongdoer that affects only an individual complainant, but also as 
the operation of industrial-relations systems that adversely affect 
minority group members. Title VII law thus focuses on the harm to 
both the group and the individual. 
Griggs redefines discrimination in terms of consequence rather 
than motive, effect rather than purpose. This definition is new to the 
field of employment discrimination, in which a subjective test had 
previously been used. The Court applied this new definition to 
invalidate hiring standards based upon education and testing, and 
in the process gave strong legal sanction to the EEOC's statutory 
interpretations. 
Significantly, the Griggs opinion was written by Chief Justice 
Burger, and concurred in by seven of his brethren Qustice Brennan 
11. The first case reaching the Supreme Court dealing with substantive rights under 
title VII was Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), in which a company 
rule against hiring women with preschool-age children was challenged. The Court held 
implicitly that sex did not have to be the sole cause of deprivation of female em-
ployment opportunities for a practice to be discriminatory. It was enough that men 
with preschool-age children were hired. However, the Court left open the possibility 
that the employment practice was a bona fide occupational qualification under the Act. 
The only other Supreme Court decision on the merits, Love v. Pullman Co., 404 
U.S. 522 (1972), upheld an EEOC administrative procedure concerning federal-state 
relations in the processing of cases under title VII. The Court made it clear that a 
technical reading of title VII's procedural provisions was inappropriate, 
12. In March 1972, approximately one year after Griggs, Congress amended title 
VII and strengthened the powers of the Commission and the rights of the complainant. 
See note 2 supra. 
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absented himself from the case). The case was decided during a: time 
in which the Supreme Court appeared to be shifting toward a cau-
tious approach to constitutional issues.13 Yet, it is a sensitive, liberal 
interpretation of title VII. It has the imprimatur of permanence and 
may become a symbol of the Burger Court's concern for equal op-
portunity. Although the Court may take a more cautious approach 
to constitutional rights of minorities,14 Griggs makes clear that sym-
pathetic interpretation of statutory rights is the order of the day. 
This dichotomy accords with the notion that the legislature rather 
than the courts should be the prime policy maker in this field. The 
recognition of legislative suzerainty in this area should be, in the 
long run, desirable. At this point in our history, many important 
civil rights have received statutory recognition from Congress.15 
It is more important, today, that we be concerned about the broad 
and practical implementation of these rights than about their con-
stitutional foundation. A judge may feel more comfortable in ren-
dering a liberal interpretation of a statute than in interpreting the 
Constitution since a decision based on the Constitution is less easily 
revised. 
II. EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY DAY FOR BLACK WORKERS IN THE SOUTH 
In Griggs, the Supreme Court dealt with an archetype of the sub-
ordination of black workers in the South. This pattern, explored in 
cases16 and by commentators,17 involved a broad range of industrial-
1!1. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), with Shapiro v. Thompson, 
!194 U.S. 618 (1969). 
14. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 
40!1 U.S. 217 (1971). 
15. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1970)), recognized the right to be free from discrimination 
in places of public accommodation, from segregation in public facilities, from dis• 
crimination in federally assisted programs, and from discrimination in employment. 
The right to be free from discrimination in voting was strengthened by the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-73p 
(1970). Title VIIl of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602-19 (1970)), established the right to be free from discrimination 
in housing. 
16. E.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 310 F. 
Supp. 5!16 (E.D. La. 1970); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 
1968). 
17. E.g., A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 159-217; R. MARsHALL, THE NEGRO AND 
ORGANIZED LABOR. (1965); Cooper 8e Sobel, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employ-
ment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 
HAR.v. L. REv. 1598 (1969); Gould, Employment, Security, Seniority and Race: The 
Role of Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1 (1967); Rosen, The 
Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1965). 
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relations devices and understandings that defined the "place" of 
black workers. 
In enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress provided a one-
year delay in the effective date18 to give labor and management an 
opportunity to comply voluntarily with the Act's provisions, and to 
allow the EEOC and the Department of Justice to "tool up" for the 
enforcement of the Act. Neither of these events occurred. During 
this one-year moratorium, southern industry engaged in a flurry of 
activity that sometimes involved genuine changes in industrial-
relations systems, but more often produced only a "cosmetic change"; 
many employers adopted seemingly neutral personnel policies, which, 
in fact, perpetuated the subordinate position of black workers.19 
Tests and educational requirements were adopted extensively in the 
early 1960's to achieve this result. The tests could be justified as 
"sound" personnel practices and would also permit an employer to 
continue the subordination of minorities. 
Before 1965 at the Duke Power Company, blacks were assigned 
only to the labor department to perform janitorial and low-level 
maintenance work throughout the Dan River Steam Station. All jobs 
in other departments were reserved for whites.20 The economic bite 
of the discrimination was clear. The top rate of pay in the "black" 
department was $1.55 per hour, which was fourteen cents below the 
bottom rate in the white departments and nowhere near the white 
departments' top rates, which ranged from $3.18 to $3.65 per hour.21 
The company did not have formal criteria for employment when this 
system of segregation was first implemented, but in 1955 it started 
to require a high school diploma for employment in the white de-
partments, ostensibly to upgrade the quality and flexibility of the 
work force.22 Blacks with high school diplomas were, after 1955, still 
employed only in the labor department.23 
18. Civil Rights Act ~£ 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716(a), 78 Stat. 266. 
19. Seniority systems were revised in some instances to permit minority workers to 
enter all-white jobs, with lower seniority than those white workers already employed, 
in accordance with the principle of Whitfield v. Steelworkers Local 2708, 263 F.2d 546 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959). (For a discussion of Whitfield, see text 
accompanying notes lll-13 infra.) Other seniority systems which had been fair on their 
face but which operated with an understanding that minority workers could not rise 
above a certain level of jobs, were reformed to reduce the formal opportunities for 
minorities. 
20. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 247 (M.D.N.C. 1968), modified, 420 
F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), revd., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
21. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1970), revd., 401 U.S. 
424 (1971). 
22. 420 F.2d at 1228-29, 
23. 292 F. Supp. at 247. 
November 1972] Employment Discrimination 65 
Duke Power responded to title VII's enactment by revising its 
hiring and transfer standards in 1965. A simple test was imposed for 
entry into the black (labor) department.24 For initial employment in 
the previously all-white departments, the passage of two standard 
industrial tests--the Wonderlic and the Bennett-was superimposed 
upon the high school diploma requirement.25 For transfer of incum-
bents between departments, the company at first required a high 
school diploma.26 This requirement kept the black workers without 
diplomas from crossing into the white departments, but it also pre-
vented some white workers in the least desirable white units from 
transferring into other white departments. They protested, and the 
company then provided that the passage of the two tests, Bennett and 
Wonderlic, would be sufficient to transfer between departments.27 
Workers in the white departments without high school diplomas 
were not required to take any tests to retain their jobs or to be 
promoted within their departments. 
When the company had completed its response to title VII in 
1965, three classes of blacks could be discerned: 
I. Blacks possessing high school diplomas who were in the labor de-
partment by virtue of the racial assignment. They had not trans-
ferred to previously white units prior to the filing of the com-
plaint with the EEOc.2s 
2. Blacks hired into the labor department before July 2, 1965, who 
did not have high school diplomas. They had to pass the two 
tests to transfer into the white departments, whether they were 
hired before or after the high school diploma requirement was 
implemented in 1955. 
3. Black applicants for new employment after July 2, 1965. To ob-
tain employment in what was previously the black department, 
they had to pass a simple test. To be employed in a formerly 
white department, they had to have earned a high school diploma 
and to pass the two tests. The same standards were applied to 
white applicants for employment. 
As a class action,29 the Griggs litigation involved those black 
workers who had achieved formal education but had found that it 
24. 292 F. Supp. at 245. 
25. 292 F. Supp. at 245-46. 
26. 292 F. Supp. at 246. 
27. 292 F. Supp. at 246. 
28, Of the fourteen blacks employed at the Dan River Station, three had high school 
diplomas. One of them was transferred from the labor department after charges had 
been filed with the EEOC but before suit was brought in district court. 401 U.S. at 
427 n.2; 420 F.2d at 1229. The other two blacks were promoted during the pendency 
of the suit. 420 F.2d at 1229. 
29. 292 F. Supp. at 244. 
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did not help them obtain better jobs, those who did not have as 
much formal schooling and were locked into the black department, 
and those black workers in the labor market who had a lower level of 
form.al education and who scored lower on tests than white work-
ers in the labor market. These facts and interests shaped the issues 
of the case which, in tum, illuminated the fundamental legal ques-
tion under title VII: how is discrimination defined? 
III. WHAT Is DISCRIMINATION? 
During the twenty-year period preceding 1965, a time in which 
some legal effort to eradicate or control racial discrimination in em-
ployment had been made, there was little opportunity for the courts 
or legal scholars to work out carefully a legal definition of discrimina-
tion.30 The term had not acquired a fixed meaning in the context of 
employment opportunities, a result in part attributable to the failure 
of civil rights agencies to adopt a definite law enforcement approach 
in administering federal and state fair-employment-practice laws and 
regulations.31 The state civil rights agencies tended to concentrate 
their efforts on achieving "voluntary compliance," which meant that 
they did not take many cases through the administrative-hearing 
procedures.32 By 1962, the civil rights agencies in the twelve states 
that established such bodies during the 1940's and 1950's had 
brought, together, only sixty-two cases to public hearing.33 Since the 
state courts would pass on the legal questions concerning discrimina-
tion under the state statutes only after the agency process was com-
pleted, the nonlitigation approach adopted by the state civil rights 
agencies meant that courts rarely had to deal with discrimination 
problems. The few state court opinions that did face up to the issue 
provided little aid in resolving the problem of defining discrimina-
tion. It is not too helpful to be told that discrimination can be prac-
ticed by "methods subtle or elusive,"34 if we are not told of its con-
tours. 
The legislators have responded to the tragic social and economic 
plight of minorities through the enactment of civil rights legislation. 
30. M. SOVERN, supra note 2, at 42-43: 
[W]hether an employer has discriminated is a subtle factual question made 
especially difficult by uncertainties in the very meaning of discrimination, a term 
the statutes do not define. • • • The statutes are quite general and litigation has 
been so infrequent that the courts have had little occasion to supply guidance. 
31. See generally Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement 
of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 HARV. L. REv. 526 (1961). 
32. A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 14. 
33. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964). 
34. Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 45, 119 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1954). 
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They sought to provide a legal solution to a complex social problem 
and uniformly left many problems, including the definitional prob-
lems, to the agencies that must enforce these laws and to the courts 
that must pass upon the validity of these agencies' policies and 
actions. 
At the risk of some simplification, we can identify in the law and 
literature three concepts concerning the nature of discrimination in 
employment opportunities. In the order of their emergence, they 
are as follows: 
Concept of Discrimina-
tion 
I. Discrimination con• 
sists of acts causing 
economic harm to an in• 
dividual that are moti-
vated by personal anti-
pathy to the group of 
which that individual is a 
member. Proof of discrim-
ination requires evi-
dence of acts, motive 
(a mens rea), and harm. 
2. Discrimination con-
sists of causing economic 
harm to an individual 
by treating members of 
his minority group in 
a different and less 
favorable manner than 
similarly situated 
members of the major• 
it}' group. Proof in-
volves evidence of 
differential treatment 
and harm, Defense of 
justification available. 
3. Discrimination con-
sists of conduct that 
has an adverse effect 
on minority group mem-
bers as compared to 
majority group members, 
Defense of justification 
for compelling reasons 
of business necessity 
is recognized. 
Interest Protected 
and Type of Conduct 
Proscribed 
Individual economic 
interest of complainant. 
Protected agamst delib-
erate denials of employ-
ment opportunities based 
on racial prejudice. 
Recognition of the in-
dividual's interest in 
securing the same treat-
ment as whites, 
"Unequal treatment" 
which may be evidence 
of racial animus. 
Group interest in 
seeing that its mem-
bers are not harmed 
in employment because 
of discrimination else-





all types of conduct 
where the injury is 
foreseeable. Covers 
all industrial-rela-






malice or will£ul 
and wanton mis-
conduct. Mens 




able man standard 
has not been adhered 
to by defendant. Also, 
constitutioual cases 
involving equal protec-
tion, particularly the 
jury cases. 





Initially, the dominant if not exclusive definition of discrimina-
tion was based upon the evil-motive, mens rea, or state-of-mind test.35 
35. See, e.g., Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practice 
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Under this test, it was necessary to establish that respondent was 
motivated by dislike or hatred of the group to which complainant 
belonged. This concept produced a series of almost insuperable diffi-
culties, as individual cases became bogged down in the vagaries of 
fact-finding. The potential law enforcement thrust of the statute was 
lost in the search for circumstantial evidence that would reveal the 
employer's state of mind. This subjective focus contributed to the 
acceptance of the view that education of employers on the legal im-
plications of employment discrimination rather than law enforcement 
was the proper procedure to follow in eliminating discrimination. 
This emphasis on voluntary compliance contributed substantially to 
the ineffectiveness of the state agencies.36 
Civil rights advocates realized in the 1950's that the state agencies 
were floundering, and therefore attempted to push legislatures into 
enacting procedural changes that they thought would free agencies 
from the bog of individual case-handling. They sought for the agen-
cies the power to initiate "pattern-centered proceedings," which 
could be commenced on the basis of the agency's analysis of a gen-
eral situation rather than on the basis of individual complaints.87 
This campaign was frequently successful as far as securing legislation 
was concerned, but success stopped in the legislative hallway; it did 
not carry into the administrator's office. Civil rights advocates to this 
day have not realized the importance of continuing political pres-
sures with respect to both the budget and the top staff appointments 
of civil rights agencies. This deficiency is not found in the political 
activities of either labor or management. 
In addition to this deficiency, the administrators lacked a legal 
concept that would enable them to discover a pattern of discrimina-
tion. How does one find a "pattern" of individual, evilly motivated 
acts that cause economic harm to individual minority group mem-
bers? The procedural change permitting pattern investigations did 
not have, as a corollary, a substantive change in the concept of dis-
crimination.38 It therefore proved to be of little use. 
It did, however, force the evolution of a second and closely re-
lated concept of discrimination. State agencies began to apply the 
Legislation I: Employers, 61 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 907, 955-56 (1967); Note, An American 
Dilemma-Proof of Discrimination, 17 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 107, 109 (1949). 
36. See generally A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 3-50; M. SovERN, supra note 2, at 
19-60. 
37. See generally M. SOVERN, supra note 2, at 31-46. 
38. Blumrosen, Antidiscrimination Laws in Action in New Jersey: A Law-Sociology 
Study, 19 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 189, 234-37 (1965), discusses the substantive implications of a 
government-initiated proceeding in which no individual bas filed a complaint. 
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"equal protection" concept of discrimination.39 This test might be 
viewed simply as a method of proving the evil motive required under 
the earlier concept of discrimination. Even so, the equal-treatment 
test became recognized as a distinct method for discerning discrimina-
tion40 and continued to provide a method for discerning discrimina-
tion as late as 1965. Professor Sovern expressed the prevailing view 
when, shortly after the 1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted, he sug-
gested that discrimination required a purpose or motive to harm an 
individual because of his race, which purpose could be inferred from 
certain conduct, mainly that denying equal treatment to minorities:u 
The fundamental question which permeated the activity of the 
EEOC in its formative days under title VII and which has since con-
sumed much of the energy of lawyers and judges in cases brought 
under title VII has concerned the concept of discrimination. Respon-
dents have pressed to confine title VII within the mold of the older 
definitions, while the EEOC, the Departments of Justice and Labor, 
and plaintiffs' counsel in individual cases have sought to establish, 
in the crucible of administration and litigation, an additional dimen-
sion to the concept. 
This effort was, without doubt, crucial. The traditional defini-
tions of discrimination permitted the employer to translate the un-
fair treatment of minorities in other segments of society into a limi-
tation on employment opportunities. For example, a much higher 
proportion of minority group members than of whites are arrested.~ 
Therefore, a policy that prohibits employment of persons with arrest 
records will exclude a higher proportion of minorities, and thus the 
administration of the criminal law may restrict employment op-
portunities of minorities.43 Similarly, if, as in Griggs, the employer 
requires a high school diploma and minorities have a smaller propor-
39. The equal protection concept bad been articulated as early as 1947. Note, The 
New York State Commission Against Discrimination: A New Technique for an Old 
Problem, 56 YALE L.J. 837, 849 (1947), discussing the then new New York statute, 
stated: "[I]t insures only that the same standards be applied to all employees and 
applicants." 
40. For an application by a state commission of the equal protection standard, see 
Lefkowitz v. Farrell, 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 393 (N.Y. Com.nm. Human Rights 1964), 
discussed in M. SovERN, supra note 2, at 179-203. 
41. M. SovERN, supra note 2, at 70-73. Professor Sovern thought that employment 
tests were legal under title VII even if not job-related. However, be thought the EEOC 
should try to persuade employers to use requirements more suited to the individual job. 
Id. at 73. See also note 54 infra. 
42. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970). 
43. The practice of automatically disqualifying applicants with several arrests (but 
no convictions) when not compelled by business necessity was held unlawful in Gregory 
v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970). 
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tion of high school graduates for reasons rooted in their subordina-
tion, the diploma requirement spreads the effects of discrimination 
in education into the employment field. If an employer locates in a 
white suburban area and selects his employees from residents of the 
area, the pattern of housing opportunities will have a similar limiting 
effect on employment opportunities; or if an employer with an all-
white work force only selects employees referred by his present em-
ployees, patterns of social segregation will determine the racial com-
position of his work force. 
These practices were not condemned by either of the traditional 
definitions of discrimination. An employer could impose such re-
quirements without an intent to exclude minorities, for each of the 
requirements could be justified on grounds of business convenience. 
That is to say, the employer might not want to take risks associated 
with persons having arrest records, or have workers without the gen-
eral education or the perseverance evidenced by a high school di-
ploma, or risk the increased tardiness that may be associated with an 
employee's living far from the plant, or have a possibly inharmonious 
social situation occur in the plant as a result of an integrated work 
force. In making these decisions, the employer would not be violating 
the evil-motive concept of discrimination. In addition, the employer 
could impose these requirements "equally" on white and black alike, 
and, as a result, not violate the equal-treatment concept of discrimi-
nation either. 
The older concepts of discrimination thus permitted the em-
ployer to insulate his employment practices from the social and 
economic problems that had arisen in society as a consequence of 
the pervasive pattern of discrimination and subordination of minori-
ties. Employers simply did not have to address themselves to this 
problem. Hence, under these older concepts, minorities remained at 
the bottom of seniority lists and at the top of the unemployment 
statistics. Meanwhile, the industrial-relations system went on its way, 
leaving the subordinated position of minorities unchanged. Prior to 
title VII and Griggs, employment was not a meaningful avenue of 
escape from subordination. 
Under the pressures of day-to-day decision-making by adminis-
trative agencies, with the aid of the private and government attorneys 
who brought the first litigation under title VII,44 with some academic 
44. EEOC findings of reasonable cause to believe that a violation of title VII had 
occurred were based on the new objective definition. The EEOC Office of State and 
Community Affairs under the direction of Peter Robertson encouraged state agencies 
to adopt objective standards in dealing with the problem of fair recruitment. 
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assistance45 and through the initial judicial decisions,46 the third 
concept of discrimination was born. It sought to relate the law of 
discrimination more closely to the social problems that had generated 
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under this concept 
discrimination was measured in terms of the adverse consequences 
inflicted upon minorities, no matter how achieved. Discrimination 
became conduct rather than a state of mind-conduct that was illegal 
unless justifiable under the narrow corridor provided by title VII.47 
This third concept of discrimination drew heavily on the con-
ceptual framework provided by the law of torts for a legally sound 
analysis that would make the Civil Rights Act of 1964 viable. The 
seniority and testing cases in the South, and the recruitment and 
hiring problems in the North, provided the occasion for the applica-
tion of this concept. It emerged from a matrix of legal, jurispruden-
tial, and sociological ideas. 
These ideas are not described here in order to analyze their im-
plications. Rather, they have operated as forces on the minds of those 
who shaped the law. They represent ways of thought that possess a 
long jurisprudential history and are embedded in the attitudes of 
lawyers. Once a concept is grasped, it is often applied without con-
scious awareness of or reference to its genesis. This predisposition 
is of fundamental importance in understanding the actions taken by 
administrators, advocates, and judges. 
One significant idea arose from legal concepts permeating the 
law of tort. The intentional infliction of harm is generally action-
able in tort law unless justified. Intention, however, is a legal con-
struct that can connote a range of mental states, from a desire to 
reach a given result, to the likelihood that a given result will flow 
from a given action.48 In the federal statutory context, for example, 
the concept that the foreseeable results will be viewed as intended 
45. The clearest discussion of the necessity for a shift to the objective discrimination 
is Cooper 8: Sobel, supra note 17. Their concern was generated in part by their par-
ticipation as counsel in several title VII cases. I articulated the same conclusion in my 
works Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RUTGERS 
L. REv. 268 (1969), and The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 
196-1, 22 id. 465 (1968). 
46. Parham v. Southwestern :Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Local 189, 
Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 
(1970); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Hicks v. 
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 310 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. La. 1970); Clark v. American Marine 
Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. La. 1969); Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 
413 (S.D. Ohio 1968); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). 
47. For a discussion of the narrow corridor afforded by business necessity, see pt. V 
infra. 
48. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8 (4th ed. 1971). 
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is well understood.49 The concept of interference with advantageous 
relations, such as contractual relations, is a special case of intentional 
tort theory.50 It was devised to deal with the type of interests in 
economic activity that are similar to those protected under title 
VII.51 Basic notions concerning what is intentional interference 
with an advantageous relation may have contributed to the rise of 
this third concept of discrimination. 
A second idea is that of legal protection for group interests. Dis• 
crimination of the type prohibited by title VII is a class- or group-
oriented phenomenon that challenges the status of every member 
of the class.52 Thus the group has an interest in the status of each 
of its members. The recognition of this group interest takes on both 
substantive and procedural implications. Substantively, discrimina-
tion is established by showing that acts of discrimination have been 
taken against the class to which plaintiff belongs. Procedurally, 
plaintiff initiates a class action suit. Jurisprudentially, this area 
affords an advanced example of the recognition given to the concept 
of group interest, which was illuminated by Professor Cowan more 
than a decade ago. 53 
A third idea focuses on systems as subjects for legal regulation. 
This concept has had a full development in labor relations and 
labor law. The industrial-relations system involves the allocation, 
functions, conditions, and compensation of employees in large-scale 
enterprise. It has as one primary purpose the reduction of the areas 
of individual discretion among managers and supervisors. For ex-
ample, specific hiring procedures may prevent the local manager 
from hiring his friends and assure distant top management of some 
quality control over employees. A seniority system, likewise, stops 
the foreman from playing favorites with promotions by requiring 
49. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967); NLRB v. Great Dane 
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-28 
(1963); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 847 U.S. 17, 45-46 (1954). 
50. 1 F. HARPER 8' F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 6.5-.13 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra 
note 48, §§ 129-30. 
51. Compare Jersey Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq. 759, 765, 53 A. 230, 232 
(1902): 
A large part of what is most valuable in modern life seems to depend more or 
less directly upon "probable expectancies." When they fail, civilization, as at 
present organized, may go down. As social and industrial life develops and grows 
more complex these "probable expectancies" are bound to increase. It would seem 
inevitable that courts of law, as our system of jurisprudence is evolved to meet 
the growing wants of an increasingly complex social order, will discover, define 
and protect from undue interference more of these "probable expectancies." 
52. "Discrimination by its very nature is directed against an entire class • • • ." 
Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 125, 253 A.2d 793, 799 (1969). 
53. Cowan, Group Interests, 44 VA. L. R.Ev. 331 (1958). 
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him to give the job to the most senior man who possesses the quali-
fications for the position. All such systems leave room for individual 
judgment of managers, but the hiring procedures themselves dictate 
the initial parameters within which this judgment may be made. 
Thus the personnel director will never have the chance to discrimi-
nate against a black youngster who never heard of the vacancy in 
the first place, or whose score on the Wonderlic test knocked him 
out of consideration for the job without an interview. Similarly, the 
black steel worker seeking a promotion will not be rejected by the 
foreman because of race, for that opening will be filled, instead, 
through the operation of the seniority system by the most senior man 
in the line of progression-who will probably be white.114 
Finally, the principle of liberal construction of the statute is 
relevant. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was aimed at "all 
aspects of discrimination,''55 even though the Senate Committee that 
issued the report using these words may not have known exactly what 
they meant. Title VII was intended as a serious response to a major 
social problem, and, for this reason, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission since 1965 has attempted to make the statute 
effective in dealing with the social problem by giving it the broadest 
possible construction. While doubters might have faltered and not 
pressed issues to judicial decision, the Commission, during its first 
years, moved in relation to the need. The issuance of the guidelines 
and the development of the concept of written reasonable-cause deci-
sions56 provided a body of law that has crystallized the concept that 
discrimination should be defined in terms of consequence.57 
54. For an illuminating discussion of this aspect of seniority systems, see United 
States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 448-55 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
406 U.S. 906 (1972). See also S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971): 
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated 
and distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the part of some 
identifiable individual or organization. It was thought that a scheme that stressed 
conciliation rather than compulsory processes would be most appropriate for the 
resolution of this essentially "human" problem, and that litigation would be 
necessary only on an occasional basis. Experience has shown this view to be false. 
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex and pervasive 
phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the problem 
in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs, and the 
literature on the subject is replete with discussions of, for example, the mechanics 
of seniority and lines of progression, perpetuation of the present effect of pre-act 
discriminatory practices through various institutional devices, and testing and 
validation requirements. 
55. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1964). 
56. One of the first written decisions finding reasonable cause to believe the Act 
was violated is reprinted in Appendix A infra. 
57. The United States Chamber of Commerce in a brief submitted as amicus curiae 
in Griggs argued that this deliberate effort to extend the statute's scope was reason not 
to give deference to the guidelines. (This argument is reproduced in Appendix B 
infra.) In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court used the standard principle of 
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The principle of liberal construction requires an anchor, which 
for title VII purposes lies in section 703(a)(2).58 This provision makes 
it unlawful for an employer to "adversely affect" an individual's em-
ployment status because of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. The "adversely affect" language has an obscure genesis. It 
was not part of the original New York fair employment law,59 and 
thus presents a technically new point of departure for purposes of 
statutory interpretation. It suggests that a court's focus of attention 
should be more on the consequences of actions than on the actor's 
state of mind. 
With these four notions setting the legal background, govern-
ment attorneys from the EEOC and Departments of Labor and 
Justice pressed for acceptance of this third definition of discrimina-
tion. Gaining acceptance of this definition also became an integral 
part of the litigation efforts of the NAACP and the Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, Inc. Without the devoted and intelligent effort 
of the many attorneys representing minorities and women, the legal 
evolution that we are experiencing in this field could not have taken 
place. The Supreme Court early recognized the importance of the 
role of private counsel in civil rights litigation. It held that the 
private litigant who brings suit under the 1964 Civil Rights Act acts 
as a "private attorney general" by furthering the public interest; 
thus, if he prevails, the litigant is ordinarily entitled to have his at-
torney fees paid by the defendant. 60 This position of the Court has 
enhanced enforcement of the 1964 Act. Griggs, for example, was 
litigated by the Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., a group 
whose attorneys have forced the fundamental legal issue of discrimi-
nation to be sharply litigated and clearly decided. 
The lower federal courts quickly grasped and applied this third 
concept of discrimination. Their opinions reveal a sense of under-
standing of the consequences that flow from employment discrimi-
nation and a determination to provide an effective remedy for this 
problem.61 
deference to the expertise of an administrative agency. See text accompanying note 161 
infra. 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1970). 
59. In 1945, New York enacted a law, [1945] N.Y. S=. Laws., ch. ll8, §§ 1-3 (codified 
at N.Y. EXEc. I.Aw §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972)), which was the model for other state 
enactments. M. SOVERN, supra note 2, at 19. 
60. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), so held in inter• 
preting a section of title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970). Title VII contains 
a provision on attorneys' fees that is worded similarly. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). 
For an application of title VII's provision, see Lea v. Cone Mill Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th 
Cir. 1971). 
61. See cases cited in note 46 supra. 
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Thus, an understanding of social need, the jurisprudential con-
ception of protection for group interest, legal doctrines borrowed 
from tort law, a statutory foundation, and the availability of counsel 
all contributed to the building of a body of law adequate to amelio-
rate employment discrimination. These laid the foundation for the 
full articulation of the third concept of discrimination by the Su-
preme Court. The elements of this concept had been generated and 
tested in the interstices of administrative and judicial experience. 
In the common law tradition, this new theory of discrimination was 
suitable for promulgation as the law of the land. It came without the 
fanfare of Brown,62 but without the bitter reaction also.63 
JV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION IN GRIGGS 
One of Duke Power's black employees who had a high school 
diploma was promoted after a complaint was filed with the EEOC 
but before suit was instituted. 64 This may be taken as the extent of 
"voluntary compliance" under informal legal pressure. After the 
filing of suit under title VII in the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of North Carolina, the two other black em-
ployees with high school diplomas were promoted. 65 This action must 
have been taken on advice of counsel who knew what was needed to 
protect the interests of the company in the litigation. After all, the 
only explanation for these men being in the black department after 
July 2, 1965, once vacancies had arisen, was their race. Refusal to 
transfer or promote them would have perpetuated the deliberate 
racial assignment. Under the evil-motive test, these acts constituted 
discrimination. 
Duke Power's counsel had correctly anticipated the view of the 
district court. The district court applied the evil-motive concept of 
discrimination to the entire case. The court looked for acts taking 
place after July 2, 1965, that were motivated by racial animus such 
as the pre-July 2 act of placing black workers in the labor department 
because that is where blacks "belonged."66 Since the black high 
school graduates had been promoted, the court found no discrimina-
62. :Brown v. :Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
63. Compare :Bacon, Of Innovations, in FRANCIS :BACON'S ~Ys 74 (Everyman's 
Library ed. 1906): 
It were good therefore that men in their innovations would follow the example 
of time itself, which indeed innovateth greatly, but quietly and by degrees scarce 
to be perceived: for otherwise, whatsoever is new is unlooked for; and ever it mends 
some, and pairs other: and he that is holpen takes it for a fortune, and thanks the 
time; and he that is hurt, for a wrong, and imputeth it to the author. 
64. See note 28 supra. 
65, Id. 
66. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 247-51 (1968). 
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tion at all.67 The hiring and testing procedures appeared to the court 
as rational management techniques for securing the best-qualified 
employees.68 Plaintiff's argument that these procedures had to be 
job-related was dismissed because such a requirement was not, in 
itself, a part of the statute.69 Plaintiff also argued that the EEOC 
guidelines required employment tests to be job-related; but since 
plaintiff never established discrimination, the requirement that the 
test be job-related was, in the court's view, simply an abstract recom-
mendation of a federal agency, which the district court felt free to 
ignore.70 
Unlike the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit applied the second concept of discrimination. Regardless of 
e..vil motive, the court held that the company's different treatment of 
similarly situated black and white employees constituted discrimina-
tion.71 White employees hired before 1955 who had earned no high 
school diploma had been able during the years to transfer and be 
promoted into higher paying positions. Black employees had been 
confined to the labor department. To treat the black employees 
equally, it was now necessary to permit those hired before 1955 to 
transfer and be promoted without regard to the high school standard 
or the testing requirement. Otherwise, the unequal treatment of 
black and white employees from the pre-1955 period would be per-
petuated. The court, therefore, concluded that treatment must not 
be equalized and that the group of black employees in question must 
be allowed to transfer and be promoted without any more strenuous 
conditions than those placed upon similarly situated white em-
ployees; that is, those hired before 1955. 
This was the "equal treatment" concept, and, in applying it, the 
court of appeals indicated, as have other courts,72 that it would 
remedy the effects of past discrimination. Yet, the only discrimina-
tion identified by the equal-treatment test was that involving the 
racial assignment of blacks to the labor department before 1955. 
Blacks without high school diplomas who were hired into the labor 
department after 1955 were not denied equal treatment because there 
were no "simHarly situated" white employees. All white employees 
hired after 1955 had high school educations. Since all the black em-
67. 292 F. Supp. at 251. 
68. 292 F. Supp. at 248, 250. 
69, See 292 F. Supp. at 250. 
70. 292 F. Supp. at 250. 
71. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1230-31 (1970). 
72. See, e.g., Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F,2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). 
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ployees with high school diplomas had been promoted, the equal-
treatment concept did not help the Griggs plaintiffs. In addition, 
there was no evil-motive discrimination practiced against them after 
1965. 
Before the Fourth Circuit, plaintiffs again tried to strengthen 
their case by relying on the Commission guidelines which required 
tests to be job-related.73 But the court of appeals majority was un-
impressed. Since no discrimination had been found,74 the EEOC's 
requirement that tests be job-related appeared to the court as being 
aimed not at discrimination, but instead at a concern by the EEOC 
that tests in general be fair. To the majority, the EEOC's position 
seemed too close to one (concerning testing) that had been rejected 
by the Congress.75 Thus, the court concluded that the job-related 
requirement was beyond the power of the EEOC. 
The sole dissenter on the Fourth Circuit, Judge Sobeloff, for-
mulated a definition of discrimination that foreshadowed the unani-
mous opinion by the Supreme Court in Griggs. Relying on the now-
famous language of Judge Butzer in Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,76 
that "Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of 
Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before 
the act,"77 Judge Sobeloff suggested that any practices having this 
effect are discriminatory.78 In light of this judgment, his review of 
the job-relatedness requirement of the EEOC led him to give defer-
ence to the agency charged with administering the Act.79 Moreover, 
his dissent makes clear his motivation for accepting the third concept 
of discrimination. In his words, the issue presented by Griggs was 
"whether the Act shall remain a potent tool for equalization of em-
ployment opportunity or shall be reduced to mellifluous but hollow 
rhetoric."80 He concluded: 
73. 420 F.2d at 1231, 
74. 420 F.2d at 1232-33. 
75. 420 F.2d at 1233-35. 
The testing provision had been written into title VII as a result of the decision in 
1964 of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission in Myart v. Motorola, Inc., 
No. 636-27, reprinted in llO CONG. REc. 5662 (1964), modified sub nom. Motorola, Inc. 
v. FEPC, 58 L.R.R.M. 2573 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1965), reud., 34 Ill. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286 
(1966). Many interpreted this decision as banning any test which adversely affected 
blacks without regard to business need. See generally Cooper&: Sobel, supra note 17, at 
1649-54; Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employ-
ment and Education, 68 COLUM, L. R.Ev. 691, 707-10 (1968). 
76. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). 
77, 420 F.2d at 1247, quoting 279 F. Supp. at 516. 
78, 420 F.2d at 1247-48. 
79. 420 F.2d at 1239-44. 
80, 420 F.2d at 1237-38. 
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This case deals with no mere abstract legal question. It confronts 
us with one of the most vexing problems touching racial justice and 
tests the integrity and credibility of the legislative and judicial pro-
cess. We should approach our task of enforcing Title VII with full 
realization of what is at stake.81 
The Supreme Court took Judge Sobeloff's point seriously. Chief 
Justice Burger, recognizing that the case was one of first impression, 
proceeded to define discrimination as follows: 
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain 
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of em-
ployment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in 
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other 
employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on 
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained 
if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory 
employment practices. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion, and the partial dissent, agreed 
that, on the record in the present case, "whites register far better on 
the Company's alternative requirements" than Negroes .... This 
consequence would appear to be directly traceable to race. Basic in-
telligence must have the means of articulation to manifest itself fairly 
in a testing process. Because they are Negroes, petitioners have long 
received inferior education in segregated schools .•.• Congress did 
not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to every person 
regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command that 
any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of 
discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group. Dis-
criminatory preference £or any group, minority or majority, is pre-
cisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by 
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary bar-
riers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to dis-
criminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification. 
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria £or employment 
or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the 
sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the £ox. On the con-
trary, Congress has now required that the posture and condition of 
the job-seeker be taken into account. It has-to resort again to the 
fable-provided that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one 
all seekers can use. The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination 
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment prac-
tice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related 
to job performance, the practice is prohibited. 
On the record before us, neither the high school completion re-
quirement nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demon-
81. 420 F.2d at 1248. See also Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 310 F. Supp. 5!16 
(E.D. La. 1970). 
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strable relationship to successful performance of the jobs £or which 
it was used. Both were adopted, as the Court of Appeals noted, with-
out meaningful study of their relationship to job-performance ability. 
Rather, a vice president of the Company testified, the requirements 
were instituted on the Company's judgment that they generally 
would improve the over-all quality of the work force. 
The evidence, however, shows that employees who have not com-
pleted high school or taken the tests have continued to perform satis-
factorily and make progress in departments £or which the high school 
and test criteria are now used. The promotion record of present 
employees who would not be able to meet the new criteria thus 
suggests the possibility that the requirements may not be needed 
even £or the limited purpose of preserving the avowed policy of ad-
vancement within the Company. In the context of this case, it is 
unnecessary to reach the question whether testing requirements that 
take into account capability £or the next succeeding position or re-
lated future promotion might be utilized upon a showing that such 
long-range requirements fulfill a genuine business need. In the pres-
ent case the Company has made no such showing. 
The Court of Appeals held that the Company had adopted the 
diploma and test requirements without any "intention to discrimi-
nate against Negro employees." ... We do not suggest that either 
the District Court or the Court of Appeals erred in examining the 
employer's intent; but good intent or absence of discriminatory in-
tent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms 
that operate as "built-in headwinds" £or minority groups and are 
unrelated to measuring job capability. 
The Company's lack of discriminatory intent is suggested by 
special efforts to help the under-educated employees through the 
Company financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition £or high school 
training. But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. More 
than that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden of show-
ing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship 
to the employment in question. 
The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and 
general testing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or 
degrees as fixed measures of capability. History is filled with exam-
ples of men and women who rendered highly effective performance 
without the conventional badges of accomplishment in terms of 
certificates, diplomas, or degrees. Diplomas and tests are useful serv-
ants, but Congress has mandated the common sense proposition that 
they are not to become masters of reality.82 
All of the concepts we have discussed come into play in the Su-
preme Court's opinion: the objective of achieving equality and the 
necessity that such equality be real; the need to eliminate barriers 
82. 401 U.S. at 429-33. 
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unless justified by business necessity and the consequences of failing 
to meet the business necessity test; the rejection of the evil-motive 
test and the shift of the burden of proof to the employer once it is 
found that the consequences of the employer's conduct adversely 
affect minorities. 
The importance of this new concept of discrimination was un-
derscored by the roles in the opinion of the job-relatedness concept, 
the EEOC guidelines, and the testing provision of title VII. All 
were viewed quite differently than in the lower courts. There, these 
factors were considered as part of plaintiffs case of discrimination. 
In the Supreme Court's opinion, they were viewed as part of defen-
dant's case of justification because a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion was established without reliance on these factors. 
The Supreme Court found discrimination because the diploma 
and test requirements screened out a higher proportion of minorities 
than of whites. These facts alone established the prima facie case of 
discrimination, and there was no need for plaintiffs to rely on the 
testing guidelines. Having made this finding of discrimination, the 
Court viewed the testing issue as a matter for the defense. Defendant 
argued that it was privileged under title VII's testing proviso to use 
tests for "general ability" that were "professionally developed" with-
out demonstrating any relation to the work in question.83 This was 
one of the arguments that Holbert and I had been unable to over-
come back in 1966, before the issuance of the guidelines. Defendant 
also argued in the Supreme Court that the guidelines went beyond 
the bounds permitted by the statute.84 The Court, having concluded 
that discrimination was bounded by the justification of business 
necessity, viewed the EEOC guidelines as spelling out the details of 
business necessity in testing situations, and upheld the Commission's 
interpretation of title VII.85 
At this point, a review of the effect of the legal process on the 
situation at Duke Power Company is in order. The statute's passage, 
without the invocation of any formal procedures, led to a change in 
the entry level and transfer standards, but no black workers were 
hired, promoted, or transferred into the more desirable departments 
or positions. Once the EEOC complaint had been filed, the company 
upgraded one black worker who had a high school diploma. After the 
district court proceedings had been commenced, the remaining two 
black workers with high school diplomas were promoted. The dis-
83. Brief for Respondent at 46-52, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
84. Id. at 52. 
85. 401 U.S. at 438-34. 
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trict court therefore concluded that its concept of discrimination 
(evil-motive) had not been proven. 
The court of appeals ordered priority for promotion and transfer 
of the six black workers who had been hired before 1955. That much 
was required by its equal-treatment concept of discrimination. The 
Supreme Court decision extended that priority to all of the remain-
ing black employees, and struck down the high school and test re-
quirements as applied to minority applicants. This re.fleets the reach 
of the statute under the Supreme Court's concept of discrimination. 
It involves a more extensive re-examination of both the conditions 
of incumbent blacks and the hiring standards than the other two 
concepts would require. 
V. THE SCOPE OF THE BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE 
The legal issues concerning testing have been exhaustively an-
alyzed elsewhere.86 The nature of the discussion and controversy 
surrounding testing is shaped by the underlying concept of discrimi-
nation. The testing proviso of title VII, as Chief Justice Burger 
pointed out by the use of italics, has a self-limiting feature, for pro-
fessionally developed ability tests can be relied upon for personnel 
decisions only if they are not "designed, intended or used to dis-
criminate."87 Since discrimination is to be measured by effect and 
since the tests as applied to minorities do have the proscribed effect, 
the testing proviso appears inapplicable in its own terms.88 
The EEOC interpretation of the testing proviso was designed to 
deal inter alia with the employer defense that tests measuring "gen-
eral abilities and aptitudes" that are not related to the particular job 
or group of jobs for which the minority applicant is being considered 
may be used, even after title VII's enactment. Griggs, however, by 
upholding the EEOC's conclusion that tests must bear a more inti-
mate relation to the necessities of the work than that provided under 
the rubric of "general abilities and aptitudes," adequately disposed 
86. E.g., A. BLUMROSEN, supra note l, at 255-69; Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co.: The Implications for Private and Public Employers, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 901 (1972); 
Cooper & Sobel, supra note 17; Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Com-
pany: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 
58 VA. L. REv. 844 (1972): Note, supra note 75. 
87. 401 U.S. at 433, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). 
88. This "self-limiting'' feature is a characteristic of the several provisions that were 
adopted as part of the compromise that led to the passage of the 1964 Act. See 42 U.S.C. 
2000e-2(h), (j) (1970). The opponents of the legislation would propose an amendment 
which the supporters would find objectionable. The supporters would then add quali-
fying language which would make the provision inoperative if discrimination was 
found. See generally A. BLUMROSEN, supra note l, at 182-85 (seniority), 251-52 (quotas), 
265-66 (testing). 
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of this argument. This argument by the employer that a standard of 
business convenience should govern was too close to the proposition 
that wrongdoers should be permitted to establish their own standards 
of conduct, an argument long rejected by the common law of negli-
gence.89 It is now clear that the standards of necessity under title 
VII are to be judicially established, after a careful scrutiny of the 
situation, so that conduct having an adverse effect on minorities will 
not be permitted simply because it would be more convenient for the 
employer. Often, it was business convenience that created the prac-
tices that proved harmful to minorities in the first place. It would 
be a meaningless gesture to characterize such practices as discrimi-
nation and then to permit them to be continued under the business 
necessity privilege. To implement the concept that discrimination 
consists of conduct adversely affecting minorities, it is essential for 
courts to fashion a narrow and carefully limited test of business 
necessity. This is precisely what adoption of the EEOC guidelines 
accomplished. 
The language and the legislative history of section 703(e)90 sup-
ports this approach. That section permits conduct otherwise pro-
hibited "in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national 
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary 
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise 
.... " On its face, section 703(e) does not extend the occupational 
qualification privilege to permit racial discrimination, and the legis-
lative reports make clear that the omission of the word "race" from 
this provision was done purposefully. The bill as reported by the 
House Judiciary Committee did not include race as a possible bona 
fide occupational qualification,91 and Congressman Williams' attempt 
to amend the bill on the House floor to include race was defeated.92 
89. "Even an entire industry, by adopting such careless methods to save time, effort 
or money, cannot be permitted to set its own uncontrolled standard." W. PROSSER, supra 
note 48, § 33, at 167, citing Shafer v. H.B. Thomas Co., 53 N.J. Super. 19, 146 A.2d 48!1 
(1958). 
A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 181-82 discusses the same concept in connection with 
discrimination in seniority systems. 
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970). 
91. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 704(e) (1964). The Committee's report stated 
that the bona fide occupational qualification "provides for a very limited exception to 
the provisions of the title. Notwithstanding any other provisions, it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to employ persons of a particular religion 
or national origin in those rare situations where religion or national origin is a bona 
fide occupational qualification." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (196!1), in 
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMMN., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLl!S VII AND 
XI OF CrvIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 2027 (1968) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
92. 110 CONG. R.Ec. 2550 (1964), in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 8191-92. 
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In the Senate, Senator McClellan tried the same approach.93 He ex-
plained that his proposal would permit racial considerations in 
employment 
when the employer believes, on the basis of substantial evidence, 
that the hiring of such an individual of a particular race ... would 
be more beneficial to the normal operations of his particular business 
or to its good will than the hiring of an individual of another partic-
ular race •.•• 
. . . The present provisions of the bill constitute an infringement 
on personal liberty, denying to the employer the right to exercise 
his judgment in his own business affairs as to whom he might em-
ploy to help him carry on his business and whom he might employ 
to make the business more prosperous.94' 
Senator Case, a proponent of the 1964 Act, responded: 
The issue is clearly drawn by this amendment. The Senator from 
Arkansas does not believe in the FEPC title of the bill and would 
eliminate them, in effect, by the provisions of his amendment. I think 
there is no question about that. 
We who believe in fair employment practices and the interven-
tion of the Federal Government in this field ... must resist the 
amendment of the Senator from Arkansas with all our power, be-
cause it would destroy the bill.95 
Senator McClellan's proposed amendment was defeated, 30 to 61.96 
While the fears of opponents are not necessarily to be read into the 
statute if they lose, it is clear that the precise issue, whether man-
agerial prerogatives and business convenience would be subordinated 
to the need to eliminate racial discrimination, was confronted and 
rejected by both houses of Congress. It is therefore simply not a 
defense under title VII for an employer to argue that conduct that 
constitutes racial discrimination, as defined in Griggs, is justified as 
reasonably necessary to the normal operations of his business. 
This analysis supports the narrow scope of justification adopted 
in Griggs and resolves the "policy questions" that the academic 
literature seeks to keep alive.97 Congressional judgment on this mat-
ter, of course, is conclusive. 
In cases decided since Griggs, the courts have proceeded along the 
path of limited justification. In Robinson v. Lorrilard Corp.,98 
Judge Sobeloff, writing for a now unanimous court, held: 
93. 110 CONG. R.Ec. 13825 (1964), in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 3183. 
94. 110 CONG. R.Ec. 13825 (1964), in LEGISLATIVE HlSToRY, supra note 91, at 3183. 
95. 110 CONG. REc. 13826 (1964), in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 3184. 
96. 110 CoNG. REc. 13826 (1964), in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 3185. 
97. See, e.g., Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 235 (1971). 
98. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). 
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[T]he applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business 
purpose for adhering to a challenged practice. The test is whether 
there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the 
practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the busi-
ness. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to 
override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively 
carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must 
be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which 
would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accom-
plish it equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.99 
Judge Sobeloff's view was carried one step further in Johnson v. 
Pike Corp. of America,100 which held that a company rule providing 
for discharge in the event of successive wage garnishments was in-
valid because of its discriminatory effect on minority employees. On 
the justification issue, the company arguments concerning time and 
expense involved in garnishment procedures were rejected; the court 
considered these to be a price that Congress indicated must be paid to 
end discrimination.101 The argument that the worker would become 
less productive if he were under garnishment was dismissed as specu-
lative.102 The court concluded, "The ability of the individual effec-
tively and efficiently to carry out his assigned duties is, therefore, the 
only justification recognized by the law."103 
The question of justification can be analyzed in this way when 
dealing with formal company policies relating to testing, education, 
arrests, or garnishments. It can also be applied with respect to re-
cruitment and seniority systems that exclude minorities, and even to 
corporate decisions such as plant location. But the vast bulk of per-
sonnel decisions that determine a worker's future are made within 
a much more fluid framework. Initial-employment, promotion, dis-
charge, and discipline decisions also take place under rubrics such 
as "best qualified" or "just cause." How these decisions will be 
viewed by the courts under title VII when the employer's personnel 
system discriminates within the meaning of Griggs is a much more 
difficult problem. 
The internal tension within the Griggs decision will provide the 
fighting ground for the next round of cases. As Griggs holds, dis-
99. 444 F.2d at 798. See also United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 
451 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972) (management convenience and 
business necessity not synonymous); United States v. :Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 
652 (2d Cir. 1971). 
100. 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
101. 332 F. Supp. at 495-96. 
102. 332 F. Supp. at 495. 
103. 332 F. Supp. at 496. 
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crimination is conduct which has an adverse effect on minority em-
ployees as a class. Yet, at the same time, the Court stated that the law 
does not provide "that any person be hired simply because .•. he is 
a member of a minority group .... Congress has not commanded that 
the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply be-
cause of minority origins."104 These statements from Griggs raise 
the all-important question of the relationship between a finding of 
class discrimination and the granting of relief to individual members 
of that class in a particular case. The possibilities for confession and 
avoidance in this situation are substantial. A respondent may, be-
cause of the strength of the "consequences" rule, admit that he has 
discriminated and then argue that the complainant or other individ-
ual members of the minority group should not benefit from remedies 
that would correct the discrimination. Presumably, the argument 
will present "good reasons" based on normal industrial criteria of 
performance and discipline for denying employment opportunity to 
the particular individual. For example, the respondent will contend 
that the majority group person was "better qualified" than a rejected 
minority group person who has the basic qualifications to do the 
work. Indeed, this contention has already been raised successfully in 
one state administrative proceeding. The Maryland Commission of 
Human Relations found discriminatory practices in recruitment, but 
refused to apply that finding to benefit an individual complainant.105 
In Jacksonville Terminal,1°6 the Fifth Circuit considered the 
104. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431, 436. 
105. Jones v. American Totalisator Co., FEP 70-796 (Md. Commn. Human Relations 
1971), copy of decision on file with the Michigan Law Review. The respondent was 
found to have used a discriminatory recruitment and hiring system that relied on word-
of-mouth referrels and walk-ins at a plant in a white geographic area with an almost 
all-white work force. The company was ordered to use a nondiscriminatory method of 
recruitment. However, the Commission gave no relief to the complainant on the 
ground that no discrimination was proved in the failure to hire him. Several whites 
were also passed over, when a friend of a supervisor was given the job. Since both 
complainant and the other whites had more experience than the white who got the 
job, the Commission concluded there was no racial discrimination. Thus, the Com-
mission s¾itched from the adverse-effects test that it had used to judge the recruitment 
system and instead used an equal-treatment test when considering the complainant's 
case. This failure to follow the adverse-effects test in the individual case could, if 
followed by other decisions, render a finding of discrimination in the recruitment and 
hiring system a bare abstraction, with no "bite" into actual employment practices. 
But compare Mabin v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 679 (W.D. Mich. 
1971), afjd. per curiam, 457 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1972). The court held that statistical evi-
dence that suggested discrimination in recruiting was relevant in resolving credibility 
issues concerning alleged discrimination in a denial of a request for transfer from a 
qualified black applicant. The court's liuk between recruiting and transferring was that 
the company employed the same processes in handling both activities. 
106. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972). 
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proof-of-discrimination question in two situations: first, with respect 
to restrictions on promotion and transfer opportunities of incumbent 
minority employees; and second, in the context of initial employ-
ment. The court rejected the company's desire to promote the "most 
qualified" employee107 because this policy would have perpetuated 
the effects of past minority subordination. It held that the company 
could not refuse to promote an otherwise eligible minority em-
ployee if he had "sufficient" ability to do the job.108 The employer 
was prohibited from applying a "best qualified" standard. However, 
the court permitted the company to use a "best qualified" standard 
in connection with newly hired employees even though the result 
was to perpetuate a pattern of white hiring.109 
This latter holding may represent a departure from the Griggs 
principle. In requiring that the government prove that black appli-
cants for employment had qualifications equal or superior to white 
applicants,11° the court appeared to apply the equal-treatment con-
cept of discrimination, rather than the adverse-effect concept. How-
ever, the case is not clear on this point since the government failed 
to prove that minority applicants possessed any level of qualifications 
to do the work or that minority qualifications were more limited 
than the white applicants' as a result of a discriminatory hiring sys-
tem. Because of this failure of proof, the court did not squarely face 
the issue of whether an employer who has discriminated against mi-
nority group members, either through an assignment or seniority 
system or through recruitment and hiring practices, may reject a 
qualified minority applicant because his white applicants are "better 
qualified." 
The decision does highlight the importance of establishing a link 
between discriminatory practices that have harmed a class of minori-
ties and the claims of individual minority applicants that they have 
been improperly denied employment opportunities. If this connec-
tion cannot be established, then the Griggs principle may be limited 
to protection of incumbent employees only and will not work for the 
benefit of applicants for employment who are members of the group 
which was discriminated against. 
If the Griggs principle, as applied by a "private attorney general," 
yields no remedy when qualified minority applicants appear for em-
ployment by an employer who has discriminated, title VII will be 
107. 451 F.2d at 448-55. 
108. 451 F.2d at 458-60. 
109. 451 F.2d at 443-48. 
110. 451 F.2d at 446. 
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of limited effectiveness. Failure to provide meaningful relief was 
the reason why the Whitfield111 case put an end to efforts to enforce 
the doctrine of the Steele case,112 which stated that a union has a 
duty to represent minority employees fairly. Whitfield upheld a col-
lective bargaining agreement requiring that senior black employees 
take a cut in pay and a loss of job security, and assume junior posi-
tions in previously white departments in order to transfer to such 
departments. This made the Steele doctrine a dead letter.113 
How then can an individual complainant obtain the benefit of a 
finding of discrimination against the class to which he belongs? 
There are two possible approaches to this problem. First, and at the 
least, a finding of class discrimination should create a presumption 
that complainant individually suffered an adverse effect from that 
discrimination. A prima facie case would be based either on the in-
ference that the discriminatory system had in fact adversely affected 
plaintiff or on the grounds of respondents' doubtful credibility be-
cause of their discriminatory practices. Either form of reasoning 
must be rooted in a rational connection between the class discrimina-
tion and the harm to plaintiff. The burden of persuasion would then 
shift to the defendant who must demonstrate that the adverse action 
was based on business necessity, was carefully tailored to the precise 
peculiarities of the immediate situation, and did not involve any re-
sidual elements of the operation of a discriminatory system.114 In 
Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,115 the Eighth Circuit moved 
toward this position. There, the court stated, 
When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifications 
to fill a job opening and that he was denied a job, we think he pre-
sents a prim a f acie case of racial discrimination and that the burden 
passes to the employer to demonstrate a substantial relationship be-
tween the reasons offered for denying employment and the require-
ments of the job.116 
What is left open by the court, of course, are the questions whether 
McDonnell Douglas would have prevailed if it had established that 
111. Whitfield v. Steelworkers, Local 2708, 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 
U.S. 902 (1959). 
112. Steele v. Louisville 8: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
113. The Fifth Circuit has explicitly rejected Whitfield's reasoning in title VII 
cases. Taylor v. ARMCO Steel Corp., 429 F.2d 498 (1970). 
114. Compare the approach taken in Mabin v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. 679 (W.D. Mich. 1971), affd. per curiam, 457 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1972) (discussed in 
note 105 supra). 
115. 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 577 (March 30, 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.LW. 3312 
(U.S., Dec. 5, 1972). 
116. 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 583. 
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another applicant was "better qualified" and what standards must 
be met to prove better qualification. At any rate, Green does impose 
the burden of proving the best-qualified defense upon the employer. 
This shift itself may achieve substantial results for minorities, par-
ticularly in light of the analysis in the Fifth Circuit's recent decision 
in Rowe v. General Motors Corp.,111 which rejected the use of sub-
jective standards for promotion in face of a statistical demonstration 
that minorities were excluded from supervisory positions. The court 
evidently felt that after a showing by the plaintiff of class discrimina-
tion and of some qualification for the job, the "best-qualified" defense 
is available, but the employer has the burden of proving it, and his 
credibility will be viewed cautiously.118 
Thus, as the law stands at present, if the minority person is re-
fused employment by an employer who has used a discriminatory 
recruitment system, the employer may defend on the grounds that 
the minority person lacks the capacity to perform the work. If the 
employer wishes to argue that he preferred to have a better-qualified 
employee, at the least he must bear the burden of proof and show 
that the employee hired was better qualified by objective standards 
to do the job. This conclusion is consistent with the point made in 
Griggs that less-qualified applicants need not be favored119 and with 
Jacksonville Terminal's reasoning. Yet, it also leaves the employer 
with the burden cast upon him by the adverse-effects test of Griggs. 
An alternative line of analysis would conclude that the "hire the 
best qualified" argument is simply not available while the effects of 
discrimination persist and while minority applicants have the basic 
qualifications necessary to do the work. This was the approach taken 
in Jacksonville Terminal with respect to incumbents and in the 
Newport News conciliation effort with respect to promotions to 
supervisory positions.120 Such an analysis appears at odds with the 
language quoted from Griggs against favoring less-qualified minority 
applicants. This language can be construed as applicable to situa-
tions in which there has not been a finding of discrimination or the 
effects of past discrimination have been eliminated. It can be argued 
117. 457 F.2d 348 (1972). 
US. See 457 F.2d at 358-59. This reasoning was explicitly adopted in Cooper v. 
Allen, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1219 (5th Cir., Aug. 29, 1972), brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 (1970), which held that once it has been determined that a minority applicant 
was denied employment by virtue of a standard illegal under Griggs, that applicant is 
entitled to back pay unless the employer can demonstrate that the person employed was 
the most qualified. 
ll9. See text accompanying note 104 supra. 
120. A copy of the Newport News agreement can be found in A. BLUMROSEN, supra 
note I, at 367-77. 
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that only when the headwinds against minorities have dissipated 
may the employer resort to the best-qualified principle to reject a 
qualified minority applicant. 
It is important to preserve the principle of qualifications for 
reasons to be discussed below;121 yet it is also important, as Griggs 
itself notes, not to allow the qualifications concept to be used to 
perpetuate patterns of discrimination. Either of the analyses sug-
gested here will accomplish both objectives. 
VJ. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
The generating principles in Griggs-that discrimination is de-
fined by adverse consequences to minorities as a group and that the 
right to be free from such discrimination runs to the benefit of mem-
bers of the group unless the respondent can justify his actions-have 
ramifications in several directions. 
A. Class Actions 
The right to bring a class action to express the group interest of 
minorities is woven so intimately into the Griggs opinion122 that one 
might think such a right is set forth in title VII. Except for those 
provisions that authorize EEOC Commissioners to file charges of dis-
crimination and authorize the Attorney General to sue if there is 
injury to a group,123 the statute is silent on the issue. Yet, in creating 
a federal cause of action, Congress necessarily invoked the broad body 
of federal procedural law incident to federal jurisdiction, which, of 
course, would include class actions in this type of case.124 The 1972 
amendments to title VII implicitly accept the concept of class actions 
by permitting charges to be filed with the EEOC "by or on behalf 
of" aggrieved parties.125 
The district court, at the close of the Griggs trial, held that the 
class covered by the judgment included "those Negroes presently 
employed, and who subsequently may be employed, at the Dan River 
Steam Station and all Negroes who may hereafter seek employment 
at the station.''126 This finding was not further reviewed, since both 
121. Pt. VIII infra. 
122. "Congress provided, in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for class actions 
for enforcement of provisions of the Act •••• " 401 U.S. at 426. 
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a),-6(a) (1970), as amended, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 4-5, 86 Stat. 104. 
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
125. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 
104. 
126. 292 F. Supp. at 244. 
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the court of appeals and the Supreme Court dealt explicitly with 
only the plight of the employed black persons. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court's holding implicitly covers not only the incumbent 
employees who were the immediate focus of the actions, but all 
minority applicants for employment as well. Griggs, therefore, sug-
gests that title VII class actions aimed at practices that promote dis-
crimination against incumbent minorities may also reach practices 
that adversely affect minority applicants for employment. 
B. "Northern-Style" Discrimination 
"Northern-style" discrimination, to which I have given consid-
erable attention elsewhere, 127 involves the combination of the south-
ern pattern of assigning minorities to lower-paying positions with 
the northern pattern of total minority exclusion from many em-
ployment situations.128 This result is accomplished through the use 
of recruitment systems in which the segregated nature of social and 
housing patterns influences the color of the work force. In these sys-
tems, the mechanism for notifying potential employees about job 
openings is frequently word-of-mouth referral by friends and rela-
tives who are apt to be of the same color. The legal problem here 
involves the scope of the duty of fair recruitment. What says Griggs 
on this question? 
The decision speaks to cases in which "barriers ... have operated 
in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over 
other employees."129 The situation before the Court involved the 
classic southern pattern in which whites were given preferences over 
black employees with more seniority because of race. However, the 
rationale of the case reaches all actions by employers having an ad-
verse effect on minority employment opportunity, even though no 
history of overt discrimination may exist. Evidence of past overt dis-
crimination in a title VII case can serve at least two purposes: It may 
prove that the employer had a discriminatory intent at some point 
in time, and it may show that the present plight of employees is the 
consequence of actions based upon that discriminatory intent. Now 
that the consequence test of discrimination has replaced the intent 
test, these reasons for evidence of past discrimination are no longer 
important. It is sufficient to show that employment practices restrict 
127. A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 218-70. For an example of northern-style dis-
crimination (practiced, ironically, in Arkansas), see Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. 
Co., 433 F .2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). 
128. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971). 
129. 401 U.S. at 430. 
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minority employment opportunities as compared to those open to the 
majority. Thus, the rationale of Griggs reaches situations in which 
there has never been a history of overt discrimination and supports 
the duty of fair recruitment and, I think also, the duty to plan for 
equal employment opportunities in connection with plant location 
and other matters.180 
C. The Use of Statistics in Making a Prima Facie Case 
Statistics may be used to demonstrate the existence of an adverse 
effect, or "built-in headwind,"131 against minorities, and may thus 
force the defendant to justify those policies which contributed to his 
poor minority employment record. The issue in these cases is when 
do statistics shift the burden of going forward to the defendant? 
Frequently, the "real grounds" for finding liability are adduced 
from evidence given by the employer's own witnesses. These "real 
grounds" are often legal constructs, created after the evidence is in. 
The plaintiff may guess at what defendant did wrong and attack 
these actions as discriminatory. His proof consists of statistics showing 
a failure to hire or promote minority persons plus identification 
of the acts and practices by defendant that may have produced the 
statistics. Full disclosure of the operations of defendant may be forth-
coming only during defendant's testimony, and consequently this 
evidence will become available only if the court requires defendant 
to present this proof; otherwise, defendant will prevail on a motion 
for a directed verdict after plaintiff has finished presenting his case. 
If the entire picture is presented before the court, however, the 
operative factors that produced the prima facie discrimination sta-
tistics may be identified and the defendant's claims of justification 
with respect to each element in the situation evaluated. The use of 
statistics may thus be well suited to securing a full judicial scrutiny 
of defendant's employment practices-a scrutiny necessary if title 
VII is to be effective. 
The relation between the statistics and the practices of defendant 
is one of probability. Thus, in Griggs, the proof that the high school 
diploma was a "headwind" against minorities was provided by statis-
tics demonstrating the general educational level in North Carolina, 
while the proof that the Wonderlic test excluded minorities was 
130. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (suit alleging discrimination 
in police recruitment, brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970)). See generally A. 
BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 218-70; Blumrosen, The Duty To Plan for Fair Employ-
ment: Plant Location in White Suburbia, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 383 (1971). 
131. 401 U.S. at 432. 
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found in the EEOC's reasonable-cause finding in the Louisiana paper 
company case.132 
The Court did not require proof that the Duke Power Company 
had in fact turned down three times as many black applicants as 
whites or that blacks had failed the Wonderlic test at the Duke 
Power plant nine times as frequently as whites. Such proof may not 
have existed at all, or if it did exist, may have involved such small 
numbers of persons as to be insignificant. The Court utilized evi-
dence of the effect of the diploma and test requirements based on 
probability and experience in other places. 
If the Court had required proof of an adverse effect of the test 
or diploma requirements in the particular case, the principle of the 
Griggs case could only be applied to the specific hiring practice or 
procedure which barred minority opportunity. Thus, a discrimina-
tory-recruitment case might yield a finding of discrimination only 
with respect to initial recruiting procedures, but not with respect to 
hiring qualification standards that had not been tested by minority 
applicants because they had never applied for employment or had 
been rebuffed at the front gate, and thus never reached the testing 
table. 
This approach would produce the ultimate frustration of piece-
meal litigation concerning the employer's hiring process, and would 
require successive litigation over each stage in the hiring and em-
ployment process. This result would stultify the implementation of 
title VII. It was carefully avoided by the Supreme Court. 
There are at least two types of statistical evidence available to 
plaintiff that will force defendant to justify his activities: (1) proof 
that particular employment standards will exclude a higher propor-
tion of minorities than of the majority group, and (2) proof that 1:he 
composition of defendant's labor force is itself reflective of restrictive 
or exclusionary practices. Griggs, with its challenge to diplomas and 
tests that reflect the inferior position of minorities in society, serves 
as an illustration of statistical proof under the first heading. Under 
the second heading falls statistical evidence showing the employment 
patterns of defendant; where this evidence shows restriction or ex-
clusion, the defendant also must come forward with explanation and 
justification. With respect to this type of proof, the courts have ex-
pressed some reservations regarding the use of statistics in proving 
discrimination.133 I believe the courts are wisely avoiding a rigid 
132. 401 U.S. at 430 n.6. 
133. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F. Supp. 977, 992 (W.D.N.Y. 
1970), afjd., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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stance. The cases coming before them now are cases of gross disparity 
which clearly indicate that the defendant has not dealt fairly with 
minorities. But at some point the courts may begin to insist on 
further proof of discrimination by plaintiff and may not want this 
option foreclosed by overly general statements.134 
D. Statistics and Remedy 
Once discrimination is found, the remedy must destroy the ad-
verse effect on minorities as rapidly as possible, while leaving a 
degree of flexibility in the implementation of the corrective mea-
sures. In the case of discriminatory failures to recruit and hire, the 
courts have properly required defendants to use a numerical stan-
dard for hiring minorities. This numerical standard might require 
that one of two, or one of three, future new employees be members 
of the class previously subjected to discrimination. 
Carter v. Gallagher135 is the most important precedent on the 
matter of numerical standards. There, the court flatly rejected a 
"hire minority workers exclusively" proposal as unduly interfering 
with other interests, but, after further consideration, the court did 
hold that a one-in-three minority-hiring ratio would be acceptable.136 
134. See Pennsylvania v O'Neill, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1286 (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 
1972). See also the discussion in pt. VII infra. 
135. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (suit brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), but title VII remedies offered a "practical guide''). 
136. 452 F.2d at 330-31. This Article is not the place for an extended discussion of 
constitutional questions concerning numerical standards or other specific remedies for 
discrimination that will provide meaningful employment opportunities for minorities. 
Some elementary comments are in order: 
1. The optimum remedy is one that does not pit worker against worker, but 
rather gives minorities or women opportunities that do not detract from those of the 
majority. This concept of a nonzero sum game is not always possible in the struggle 
for scarce jobs. 
2. There is no constitutional right on the part of the "most qualified" person to a 
job or promotion in private employment. We have never constitutionalized rights to 
employment opportunities. See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On 
Limiting the Abusive Exerdse of Employer Power, 67 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1404 (1967). 
Except when restricted by statute or contract, an employer remains free to hire or 
promote for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. Public employers, on the 
other hand, may function under a more vigorous standard judicially imposed by the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments • .But this standard requires only that the public 
employer not be arbitrary or use invidious classifications. The public employer has a 
wide range of optional employment policies under this standard and is not required 
to hire the most qualified. See Contractors Assn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
3, The white male majority has no legitimate expectation that patterns or practices 
that adversely affected minorities or women will continue to benefit them. 
4. In imposing a remedy under a statute such as title VII, the courts are free 
to shape such relief in a manner that will correct the injustice suffered by plaintiff 
and the appropriate class, abolish the illegal practice, and assure that it will not recur. 
They may not impose sanctions that are "punitive." Cf. Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 
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While somewhat reminiscent of the conversation concerning price 
and principle between George Bernard Shaw and the lady, the 
Carter case does, I think, point the way through the maze of "quota" 
and "preferential treatment" talk. It suggests: (1) The use of numeri-
cal standards to increase minority hiring is an appropriate remedy 
for discrimination. (2) Those standards must have a degree of flexi-
bility-the court will not order all vacancies saved for minorities. 
(3) The order will only operate until the defendant demonstrates 
that his system is acting fairly;137 at that point the chancellor's foot 
will be lifted from the defendant's neck. 
All of these propositions are compatible with a larger vision 
of how the courts can, in a manner consistent with judicial traditions 
and in concert with other institutions of government, destroy the 
pattern of discrimination in employment. This point will be dis-
cussed further below.138 
VII. "POWER" OF THE EEOC 
A scholar who was finishing a book on employment discrimina-
tion when title VII was passed characterized the EEOC as a "poor 
enfeebled thing."139 Professor Sovern was reacting, along with many 
365 U.S. 651 (1961). This, rather than the Constitution, is the appropriate legal frame. 
work for discussion of the problem. It is obvious that the majority must stand aside 
while discrimination is being remedied in situations of scarcity where there is no 
other alternative. This result poses no constitutional question. The issue of "how far 
aside" the majority must stand is closely related to the issue of how quickly will the 
discrimination be remedied. That question is for the judiciary, which must interpret 
the scope and reach of title VII. In this framework Carter (one of three), Local 53, 
Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (one of two), Castro v. 
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (one of three), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 4 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1286 (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 1972) (one of three is inappropriate if the 
pool from which minorities are to be drawn is not composed of qualified persons), 
have already hammered out the formulas to be used in shaping remedies under the 
statute. The "constitutional talk" in some of these cases is, in my view, a way of 
discussing wise judicial policy under the statute to end the effect of discriminatory 
practices as rapidly as possible without "freezing" majority employment opportunities. 
As long as the courts focus on these issues, there is no constitutional question in 
affording a meaningful remedy for discrimination against minority group individuals. 
The arguments cast in constitutional terms appear to be revisions of the ancient 
and discredited arguments for "going slow," using "education," and not trying to 
solve social problems "overnight." We have paid a terrible human price for listening 
too closely to those arguments. The kernel of wisdom in them has been buried in the 
rhetoric of the status quo. That status quo is now unacceptable. This is the meaning 
of Griggs. The courts are doing a competent job at the moment of identifying the 
rate of minority and female advance that they believe will both reduce the "head-
·winds" and be, at least grudgingly, acceptable to the policy makers and to society. For 
the judges who hammered out the one-of-three formula in Carter v. Gallagher, 
there could be no constitutional talisman, only the lonely task of judgment. 
137. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1970). 
138. Pt. VIII infra. 
139. M. SOVERN, supra note 2, at 205. 
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other civil rights supporters, to the gutting of the administrative 
procedure that they believed important to combat employment dis-
crimination. They wished to give the EEOC administrative-hearing 
and cease-and-desist-order power similar to that possessed by the 
National Labor Relations Board. This approach was stricken from 
the original bill in a congressional compromise.140 Instead, the Com-
mission was given the power to investigate, find reasonable cause, 
and attempt to conciliate. If it failed, then either the complainant 
or the Attorney General-but not the Commission-could file suit 
in federal district court.141 The Commission was given, in addition, 
power to investigate, to require reporting and record-keeping, and 
to adopt procedural rules.142 It was not given substantive rule-
making power.143 
In the face of these restrictions of its formal powers, the EEOC 
adopted other approaches that would enable it to be influential in 
dealing with discriminatory conduct. Two such techniques were 
approved by the Supreme Court in Griggs: the elevation of a finding 
of reasonable cause into a decision with some value as precedent144 
and the issuance of interpretative guidelines indicating the ap-
plication of title VII to general classes of situations.145 As noted 
above, the power to issue such guidelines does not flow from any 
clear congressional grant of authority.146 Yet, as Professor Davis 
points out, such a power is an attribute of any administrative agency 
140. See H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1963). 
141. Civil rughts Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 706-07, 78 Stat. 259, as 
amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 4-5, 86 
Stat. 104. 
142. Civil rughts Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 709-10, 713(a) 78 Stat. 
262, as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 
§§ 6-7, 86 Stat. 107. 
143. Section 7I3(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970), gives the EEOC only 
procedural rule-making power. The word "procedural" was inserted into the section 
granting rule-making authority on the motion of Representative Cellar, generally a 
civil rights supporter. His amendment was adopted with little discussion and was even-
tually enacted. lI0 CONG. R.Ec. 2575 (1964), in LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY, supra note 91, at 
3329. Section 713(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970), which protects individual 
respondents who act in accordance with advisory opinions given by the Commission, 
certainly cannot be considered a grant of general rule-making authority. Thus the legis-
lative history of title VII seems to indicate clearly that Congress did not intend to grant 
the EEOC substantive rule-making power. 
144. See 401 U.S. at 430 n.6. 
145. 401 U.S. at 433-34. 
146. See note 143 supra. But cf. ruiey v. Bendix Corp., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 951 
(5th Cir. July 14, 1972), in which the court referred to section 7I3(a) as authority for the 
issuance of the guidelines on religious discrimination. The case, however, appears to 
have turned on the congressional validation of the EEOC's interpretation in the 1972 
amendments to title VII, which added section 70I(j) defining religious discrimination. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103. 
96 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:59 
that interprets and applies a statute.147 The power to interpret and 
apply the statute carries with it the power to announce in advance 
how the agency intends to perform these tasks. Thus, the Com-
mission drew its authority to issue guidelines from its function of 
interpreting title VII. But whence came this function? 
Under the statute, the Commission is first to investigate a charge 
that title VII has been violated, and then to determine whether 
there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true. This 
process requires that the Commission interpret title VII, in a pre-
liminary manner, in light of the facts gathered during its investi-
gation.148 The authority to issue guidelines ultimately rests on the 
EEOC's power to determine if there is reasonable cause to believe 
title VII has been violated. Except for the reasonable-cause provision, 
it is difficult to find justification in the statute for the guidelines. 
Perhaps the "technical assistance"149 or "technical studies"150 sub-
sections could provide such a basis. However, the testing guidelines 
mentioned in Griggs involved a direct form of statutory inter-
pretation. The Court's conclusion that the guidelines must be 
followed by the federal district courts endowed them with qualities 
of law that are not the result of the usual technical studies. 
The history of the finding-of-reasonable-cause requirements in 
fair-employment,practice legislation is interesting. Most of the state 
statutes existing prior to title VII required a finding of reasonable 
or probable cause before conciliation efforts could be undertaken.151 
But these provisions were usually ignored. Conciliation efforts were 
commenced without adequate investigation or without a judgment 
by an enforcing agency that any "wrong" need be corrected.lli2 This 
technique contributed to weak conciliation settlements. Moreover, 
when the probable-cause provisions were followed by the state 
agencies, the finding simply consisted of one-line statements such as 
147. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY Jusnc:E: A PRELIMlNARY INQUIRY (1969). 
148. Under the intense pressures caused by a backlog of work, the Commission has 
departed from the statutory procedure in 1970 in quest of "predecision settlements." 
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1901.19(a)-(c) (1972). There is no evidence that this new procedure has 
added any efficiency, dispatch, or justice to the work of the Commission. 
149. The Commission has power "to furnish to persons subject to [title VII] such 
technical assistance as they may request to further their compliance with [title VII] or 
an order issued thereunder." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1970). 
150. The Commission has power "to make such technical studies as are appropriate 
to effectuate the purposes and policies of [title VII] and to make the results of such 
studies available to the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (1970), 
151. See, e.g., CAL. l.ABoR CODE § 1421 (1971); N.Y. ExEc. L\.w § 297 (1972). 
152. See Blumrosen, supra note 38, at 223-24, 
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"the Commission finds probable cause to believe the statute has been 
violated." 
The state agencies did not consider the reasonable-cause finding 
as a formal document interpreting the statute in light of the known 
facts. This approach was developed by the EEOC and has proved to 
be a genuine innovation.153 It has spawned hundreds of published 
decisions and a matrix of law that never existed before the Com-
mission was established. It also provides the logical foundation for 
the issuance of interpretative guidelines. 
However, the question of the weight to be accorded the EEOC 
guidelines is another matter. Since the authority to issue guidelines 
is based on the authority to interpret title VII, these guidelines are 
a fortiori "interpretative" rules within the meaning of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.154 As a consequence, no hearing or public 
participation in the guideline-making process is required.155 There-
fore, in preparation for the testing guidelines, the EEOC Office of 
Research called together a group of testing experts, to whom Ken 
Holbert and I explained the nature of the problem of discrimination 
with which we were confronted, and asked them to prepare a state-
ment. That statement was later reviewed by the General Counsel and 
his staff, and by the Commissioners before issuance. 
The utility of guidelines and bulletins is obvious. Labor relations 
of large corporations are conducted on a sophisticated basis; labor 
relations experts, lawyers, personnel officials, union officers, and the 
like constantly keep up to date on developments in the law and 
regulations affecting their operation. They read the volumes of 
loose-leaf material that are issued by regulatory agencies and serve 
as part of the "law transmission system," which carries into effect 
the interpretation of statutes and regulations in thousands of indus-
trial-relations situations. Without the benefit of this system, the 
decision makers in Washington would never be heard or heeded in 
the plants throughout the country.156 
The industrial-relations community-labor and management-
is accustomed to receiving guidance and information in the form 
of agency decisions, interpretations, and bulletins. The EEOC at-
153. See A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 19-20, 44-46. 
154. 5 u.s.c. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970). 
155. 5 u.s.c. § 553 (1970). 
156. For a discussion of the types of problems encountered by the law transmission 
system when implementing administrative interpretations and guidelines, see Cramton, 
Causes and Cures of Administrative Delay, 58 A.B.A. J. 937 (1972). 
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tached itself to this tradition by publishing "sanitized versions"157 
of the reasonable-cause findings, and by publishing guidelines on 
employment testing and other subjects.158 These guidelines and in-
terpretations enable intelligent responses by the industrial-relations 
community. The response may demonstrate agreement within the 
industrial-relations comm.unity with respect to the EEOC's inter-
pretation and encourage a change of policy as dictated by the guide~ 
lines, or, at the other extreme, guidelines may lead to litigation 
against the EEOC's decision as in the airlines159 and the newspaper160 
cases. 
The original testing guidelines consisted of one paragraph of 
legal interpretation (that is the paragraph involved in Griggs), while 
the remainder contained background statements concerning good 
personnel-testing procedures. In passing on the validity of the Com-
mission's interpretation, the Supreme Court stated in Griggs: 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having en-
forcement responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting § 703(h) 
to permit only the use of job-related tests. The administrative in-
terpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great 
deference. . .. Since the Act and its legislative history support the 
Commission's construction, this affords good reason to treat the 
guidelines as expressing the will of Congress . ... 
. . . From the sum of the legislative history relevant in this case, 
the conclusion is inescapable that the EEOC's construction of§ 703(h) 
to require that employment tests be job related comports with con-
gressional intent.161 
The importance of the distinction between those guidelines that 
should be given "great weight" and those that "express the will of 
Congress" presumably will not be lost in the federal district courts. 
The binding effect given the guidelines is one additional indicator 
of the importance the Court has attached to the policy of eliminating 
discrimination. 
The process used by the Supreme Court in determining the 
validity of EEOC guidelines involves a search through the legislative 
history for a clear demonstration that the EEOC interpretation was 
157. This means giving descriptions of the facts without giving the names of the 
parties or revealing what was said or done during conciliation attempts, in conformity 
with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970). 
158. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1-.31 (sex), 1605.1 (religion), 1606.1 (national origin), 1607.1-.14 
(employee selection procedures) (1972). 
159. Air Transp. Assn. of America v. Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C. 1967). 
160. American Newspapers Publishers Assn. v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100 (D.D.C. 
1968). 
161. 401 U.S. at 433-34, 436 (emphasis added). 
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not intended. If the matter is ambiguous or if the legislative history 
supports the interpretation of the EEOC, the Griggs analysis requires 
that the district courts follow the guidelines. This confers great 
responsibility on the EEOC, a responsibility fully commensurate 
with the policy of providing equal opportunity and the desirability 
that the industrial-relations community be given specific guidance. 
In light of the shifting meaning of discrimination and the 
evolving conceptions of equal opportunity, there will be few matters 
on which the congressional intent will be found to be clearly 
contrary to a Commission guideline. The congressional discussion 
never reached the level of detail that is involved in the application 
of title VII to particular cases. The legal concept of discrimination, 
which is itself a fundamental notion underlying all of the detailed 
matters of interpretation, was not seriously addressed by the 
Congress. It is a jurisprudential conception, derived from the law 
of tort, and far more suitable for exposition through judicial 
decision than for careful examination in the political forum. 
Congressmen can react to social needs. Their administrative 
staffs and interest groups can prepare studies, data, and arguments. 
The Justice Department lawyers can prepare scholarly memoranda 
for use in the heat of the political debate, and legal and other 
academicians can review these proposals and recommend changes. 
Out of these ingredients the legislative product emerges. But the 
legislation itself is far from the last word. The application of the 
legislation to specific situations remains. The administrative and 
judicial processes work between the cup of legislation and the lip 
of life. The jurisprudential conceptions applied at this point deter-
mine the operative effect of the statute. 
Two examples pointing in opposite directions will suffice. 
Judicial hostility to the workman's compensation acts is the classic 
illustration of how reluctance by judges-in this case reluctance to 
surrender their control over the course of personal-injury litigation 
in employment--can neutralize legislative intent.162 On the other 
hand, one need only examine the Supreme Court's sympathetic 
support of the comparative-negligence principle in the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act163 cases to find an example at the other extreme. 
In these cases, the network of negligence doctrines has been cast 
aside in furtherance of the congressional policy.164 
162. See, e.g., Jacquemin v. Turner 8: Seymour Mfg. Co., 92 Conn. 382, 103 A. ll5 
(1918); Leckie v. H.P. Foote Lumber Co., 40 S.2d 249 (La. App. 1948). 
163. 45 u.s.c. §§ 51-60 (1970). 
164. See, e.g., Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., .354 U.S. 901 (1957); Rogers v. Mis• 
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It is now indisputable that the intention of the federal courts is 
to afford maximum minority employment opportunity under title 
VII. Minority employment programs under executive orders have 
been given judicial support and sanction,165 and the courts have 
made clear that, if necessary, constitutional principles will be 
brought into play to accomplish this goal.166 Nevertheless, the hope 
remains in the judiciary that the administrative agencies will be 
able to do the job.167 To this end, the courts are arming the "poor 
enfeebled thing" with the necessary doctrinal tools and are en-
couraging private litigants to act as "private attorney generals" 
by liberally granting attorney's fees to the prevailing party.168 In 
short, the federal courts are taking the view that the national crisis 
that gave rise to title VII still exists and that the application of the 
statute may determine the outcome of that crisis.169 
VIII. THE LIMITS OF GRIGGS 
We can expect criticisms of Griggs on a variety of grounds. Those 
who have developed "theories of fair employment practice laws" 
may maintain that the decision does violence to their conceptions 
of the function and purpose of fair-employment laws. For example, 
Professor Fiss of the University of Chicago has stated, 
The employer's interest in wealth maximization and the rigors of 
the market place are generally acknowledged in fair employment 
laws. A fair employment law is a limited corrective strategy and the 
societal interest in efficiency is a major limitation.110 
Similarly, the anonymous but influential Harvard Law Review has 
said, "Congress in Title VII attempted to aid minority employment 
within the constraints of color blindness and non-interference with 
employer decisions that are based on legitimate business consider-
ations."171 
souri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957); Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 
(1943). 
165. Contractors Assn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 854 (1971); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1971). Cf. Porcelli v. Titus, 
431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971). 
166. Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967). 
167. Hadnott v. Laird, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 375 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 29, 1972). 
168. See note 60 supra. 
169. Compare Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting): 
The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social advantage, 
and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by logic and the 
general propositions of law which nobody disputes, Propositions as to public policy 
rarely are unanimously accepted, and still more rarely, if ever, are capable of 
unanimous proof. ' 
. 170. A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 235, 303 (1971). 
171. Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights .ti.ct of 1964, 84 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1109, 1166 (1971). 
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Both of these formulations are contradicted by the analysis in 
Griggs. Insofar as the language of the statute and its history are 
concerned, the Griggs decision seems correct.172 Neither wealth maxi-
mization, management prerogative, nor color blindness were domi-
nant themes in the congressional decision.173 
There is another difficulty with what may be called the "Fiss-
Harvard" analyses. They assume that legal rules should describe 
directly and in detail the result that the law seeks to achieve. This 
is too simple a notion. Legal rules are filtered through the law trans-
mission system.174 Thousands of men and women must respond to 
these rules in the exercise of their discretion as lawyers, writers, 
academics, personnel administrators, management officials, civil 
rights advocates, union officials, and the like. They must internalize 
and accept certain propositions from the perspective of their own 
particular roles within their own structures. It is literally impossible 
to write a single statement or a single opinion that will be tailored 
to the situations of all who have contributed to the operation of 
systems that have restricted minority employment opportunities. 
To maintain maximum pressure on this network of discriminatory 
attitudes, actions, and concepts, the law of employment discrimi-
nation speaks in broad, principled terms and forces the responses 
into narrow channels of justification. This maximizes the likeli-
hood that the law will indeed affect the course of conduct concerning 
minorities. 
To meet a massive problem, a massive dose of law is required. 
Liberal judicial construction and a maximum enforcement effort 
are also essential. We can count on the conservative forces-political, 
172. For an example of how the legislative history will seem at odds with the Griggs 
decision in the absence of the concept of discrimination adopted by the Supreme Court, 
see Wilson, supra note 86, at 852-58. 
173. The subordination of managerial prerogative with respect to racial discrimina-
tion was precisely what Congress did have in mind. See text accompanying notes 90-96 
supra. The Harvard Development, supra note 171, is especially unresponsive to the 
basic congressional judgment that racial discrimination was to be dealt with without 
any bona fide occupational qualification privilege, while that privilege was available to 
the other grounds of discrimination. The part of the Development dealing with racial 
discrimination is based on the principle of balancing minority interests within the 
constraints of color blindness and noninterference with employer decisions. But 
in its discussion of the bona fide occupational qualifications with regard to sex, 
the Development concludes, "The statute offers no exception based on cost ••• to be 
borne by employers ordered to cease sex discriminations." Id. at 1180. Without disagree• 
ing with its conclusion considering the scope of the bona fide occupational qualification, 
the Development seems prepared to go further in protecting management interests in 
connection with race discrimination than in connection with sex discrimination. This 
judgment was squarely rejected in the congressional debates over section 703(e). 
174. A formal discussion of this system can be found in Laswell, Toward Continuing 
Appraisal of the Impact of Law on Society, in THE I.Aw SCHOOL OF TOMORROW 87 (D. 
Haber &: J. Cohen ed. 1968). For suggestions as to its application in this field, see 
A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 20-23, 155, 213-17. 
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economic, legal, and social-to protect their vital interests and thus 
to modify the effect of our legal formulation in the specific life 
situations. A broad statement of law is necessary to begin to achieve 
meaningful results. 
Obviously, there are risks in this approach. The message of the 
Court might be taken too literally. There are two responses to this 
fear. First, the appellate courts will correct overreaction. Yet, even 
if overreaction is an actual risk, we must ask who should bear the 
consequences of a court's misperception of its role-the class of 
minorities who have been the victims of discrimination, or the class 
of respondents who have created and administered the discrimina-
tory pattern? This inquiry takes us back to the fundamental policy 
judgment concerning the sweep that the Court should be prepared 
to give to the statute. If this sweep be broad, one of the risks that 
may be appropriately placed on the defendants is that involving a 
mistaken application of the statute. This limited risk can, however, 
be cured through the appellate stages of litigation. To help minori-
ties clear out the morass of discriminatory patterns present in this 
nation's economy, Congress appropriately placed the burden of such 
litigation on the respondent class. This Article has been concerned 
with the positive scope of the Griggs principle because the outer 
reaches of Griggs will determine the ex.tent to which the law will 
cope with inequality in employment opportunities. Yet, it is also 
necessary to consider the other side of the coin, the question of 
Griggs' limits. If discrimination is defined by the presence of "built-
in headwinds" against minority grQups, then the absence of this 
adverse effect on minorities would force plaintiffs back to the evil-
motive and equal-treatment tests of discrimination. 
The existence of adverse effect is a question of judgment. There 
is no mechanical talisman to identify it. Adverse effect exists in many 
areas at this time because of historical patterns of restrictions upon 
minority group members and women. In coping with the present, 
extreme situations, civil rights advocates and some governmental 
agencies have begun to use "goals, targets, and timetables" to increase 
minority and female employment opportunities. The "Philadelphia 
Plan" of the Labor Department, which was created to deal with con-
struction industry discrimination, takes this approach (subject to a 
"good faith" defense) and has been upheld by the Third Circuit.176 
The application of numerical proportions to recruiting for appren-
ticeship programs has also been upheld under title VII.176 
175. Contractors Assn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
176. United States v. Ironworkers, Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
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In these circumstances, advocates for a rapid increase in minority 
or female participation in the labor force argue for proportional 
representation based on population figures, or for parity in employ-
ment opportunities. Racial minorities in central cities argue for a 
formula based on the central city, rather than the county or region, 
while advocates for women's rights uniformly rest their equal-oppor-
tunity demands on population proportions. The risk in accepting 
these arguments is obvious. Once a statistical analysis becomes 
popular, there may be a tendency for various groups to claim "their 
share" of employment opportunities, for advocates to seize upon 
proportional representation, and for administrators to think of 
proportions as ends rather than means. 
But such risks do not justify avoidance of the venture, for the 
human needs are too great. The underlying concern of those who 
worry about quotas and individual rights should be answered not in 
a refusal to reform the inequalities in our society, but in a judgment 
that the reform must succeed so that the interest in flexibility can be 
reasserted. 
The proportional-employment argument must be understood in 
the context of the near-total exclusion of minority groups and women 
from many sectors of the labor market. Where an employer or other 
institution has virtually no female employees in other than minor 
clerical positions, the argument that fifty per cent of the managers 
should be females need not be understood as an argument in favor 
of a world in which women hold fifty per cent of all jobs. Similarly, 
where a construction union has substantially an all-white member-
ship working in a city with sixty per cent black citizens, the argument 
for population parity among journeymen electricians must be con-
strued as an argument for a rapid increase in the number of minority 
electricians. Viewed in these terms, the numerical standards proposed 
in various plans and programs are not an end in themselves, but 
rather a means of eliminating the adverse effect of historical dis-
crimination patterns as rapidly as possible. So used, numerical 
standards are essential as a remedial tool to eliminate patterns of 
discrimination. Our history demonstrates that milder medicine will 
not cure the disease, but that numerical standards will work. Less 
specific standards are brushed aside in the interests of continuity of 
institutional activity. 
Numerical standards are attended to in our society and are cap-
able of enforcement within institutions, and by government upon 
404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. IBEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.) cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th 
Cir. 1969). 
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institutions. Furthermore, concentration on numerical standards as 
a remedy for discrimination permits the flexibility essential for our 
institutions to continue. 
The use of numerical standards will allow us to overcome one 
inevitable dilemma posed by those who wish to reform industrial-
relations systems. That is to say, if the remedy consists of using ob-
jective standards for qualification of employees, then because of the 
history of discrimination in other areas of society, many minority 
persons will be excluded from employment opportunities. The issue 
then becomes the relevance of these standards, and that calls into play 
the highly technical issue of validation. Thus, title VII may become 
a full-employment act for industrial psychologists. Furthermore, 
many judgments with respect to personnel actions are "net judg-
ments" not fully capable of quantification in all of their dimensions; 
the subjective aspects of hiring often cannot be quantified. Thus, a 
rule requiring that judgments be made on objective criterion re-
quires the respondent, ultimately, to "lie up to the headnote." This 
approach creates a multitude of factual disputes; so we have also in 
title VII a full-employment act for lawyers. 
On the other hand, subjective judgments provide, in fact, a fer-
tile atmosphere for producing attitudes, policies, prejudices, and 
stereotypes, and consequently they may tend to restrict employment 
opportunities of minorities and women. Where discrimination exists 
the use of these subjective judgments should not be allowed, and, as 
Jacksonville Terminal and Green v. McDonnell Douglas illustrate, 
the courts are carefully cutting back on their use. 
The dilemma, therefore, is that objective standards may exclude 
minorities, while subjective standards may permit discrimination 
against them. One way to resolve this dilemma is to measure em-
ployment practices against the basic principle of Griggs: If the ad-
verse effect on minorities continues, then discrimination will be 
deemed to still exist; when the adverse effect is no longer identifiable, 
discrimination a la Griggs is at an end. While the adverse effect is 
being eliminated, a primary consideration is whether, on the basis 
of a flexible formula that will allow some deviation from the norm, 
any particular remedial proposal adequately contributes to an ac-
ceptable increase in the number of minorities or females hired. 
Thus, during the period of adverse effect, all criteria, objective and 
subjective, are suspect if they do not contribute to the expeditious 
elimination of the adverse effect. 
Once the adverse effect has been dissipated, remedial programs 
may be modified; but they should retain provisions to assure that 
the adverse effect does not reassert itself once the hand of govern-
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ment is withdrawn.177 Thus, remedial programs should encourage 
the industrial-relations system to operate fairly on its own terms and 
within its own parameters. For example, an employer with an all-
white plant who recruits by word-of-mouth referral discriminates 
because minorities do not have notice and opportunity to apply for 
employment. The remedy to such a problem should include affirma-
tive recruitment efforts that would lead to rapid increase in minority 
employment. Once this has been ·achieved, the same word-of-mouth 
referral system will operate among minority employees and their 
friends and associates. The employer will then have a stream of 
minority applicants. If the hiring practices have been otherwise cor-
rected so that they do not exclude minorities at another point in 
the procedure, the employment pattern for this employer thereafter 
should continue to include substantial numbers of minorities. 
Another example might be taken from Rowe v. General Motors, 
the case in which the defendant's supervisors were predominantly 
white males. Since the first-level supervisor is influential in deciding 
who should be hired, promoted, and made supervisor, the tendency 
to perpetuate the existing pattern is strong. But once a remedy has 
been applied so that a substantial number of minority persons or 
women have become supervisors, they will seek to maintain and pro-
mote some of their own into positions of influence and ultimately 
into positions similar to theirs. The same phenomena that discrimi-
nate when the system was controlled by white males will provide 
an integrative effect, once minorities and women have occupied some 
of the supervisory positions. At that point, governmental programs 
should become far less important. 
The phrase used by Chief Justice Burger-"built-in headwinds" 
--captured the sense of futility and frustration that has confronted 
minorities in their quest for equality. Griggs measured that frustra-
tion by gross statistics. The high school diploma test screened out 
three times as many blacks as whites; the Wonderlic test screened 
out nine times as many blacks.178 The Court's prohibition of these 
requirements will serve to alleviate the impact of discrimination on 
minorities. But when does the sense of injustice fade? When does the 
adverse effect dissipate? At what point does discrimination end, or, 
more precisely, at what point along a continuum is it appropriate to 
reduce restraints on the employer's practices? 
A reduction in legal pressure may be appropriate long before the 
law gives up jurisdiction. The adverse effect will dissipate before 
177. See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1970); 
Davis v. Washington, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1132 (D.D.C. July 31, 1972). 
178. 401 U.S. at 4!0 n.6. 
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minority groups and women achieve a mathematical proportion of 
the labor force. Griggs does not demand that the work force of each 
large employer should be a microcosm of the total population or 
labor force. Griggs only requires that the structures responsible for 
restricting minority opportunity be destroyed. The accomplishment 
of this objective must be measured by increases in minority or fe-
male participation. Therefore, numerical standards are an appro-
priate tool. But carried to a pseudological conclusion, such standards 
would structure opportunities on society along lines of race, national 
origin, and sex. The individualist strain in our traditions stands 
against that proposition. The moral strength behind the broad defi-
nition of discrimination also cuts against a mathematical allocation 
of job opportunities by group characteristic. Thus, the use of this 
third concept of discrimination should be decreased, and the range 
of employer discretion increased, as the crude consequences of minor-
ity subordination are eliminated. We will revert back toward evil-
motive and equal-treatment concepts of discrimination when the 
social system operates in a fairer way. 
When the adverse effect dissipates is a question of judgment for 
courts and administrators. As with any such question, there is risk 
of error. The Fifth Circuit in Whitfield committed such an error 
when it said "angels could do no more" than to establish a "fresh 
start" for the future, even though this approach would leave blacks 
behind whites.179 It corrected this error in a stream of cases in the 
late 1960's and in effect overruled Whitfield in 1970.180 
There is-and can be-no guarantee that the courts and the ad-
ministrators will wisely decide whether the adverse effect has been 
dissipated. The pressure of cases will make them dependent on rules 
of thumb based on statistics, which may, over time, be incorporated 
into the law. But we have far to go before this stage is reached.181 
The economic condition of minorities and the continuing lack of 
employment opportunities suggest that much must be done-and 
quickly-before serious disagreements over the need to continue 
such strong remedies will arise. To achieve the prompt reform ·with-
out creating a rigid system for allocating job opportunities requires 
179. 263 F.2d at 551. 
180. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text. 
181. My own preference is to use relative unemployment figures to measure minority 
progress. A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 23-27. Earnings among comparable majority 
and minority groups are also relevant. Id. Most of these indicators are complied 
regularly by the federal government. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, The Social and Economic Status of Negroes in the United States, 1969, BLS 
Rep. No. 375, at 13-46 (1970). 
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that our administrators and courts be courageous and wise along 
both dimensions. 
IX. EPILOGUE-ONE CONSEQUENCE OF A DECISION 
By 1971, my life had substantially changed from the days when 
we sought the issuance of the guidelines. Instead of commuting be-
tween Washington and the Deep South, I was commuting between 
New York and Paris. After one recent trip, I found myself riding 
to Newark with the industrial-relations director of a large national 
company. We identified our common professional interests, and he 
told me how his company and the union with which it bargains had 
negotiated away certain education and testing requirements for 
entry into training and apprenticeship programs. Since then, he said, 
some 150 employees, two thirds of them black, had left the ranks of 
the unskilled labor force of the company and entered into skilled 
trades training or apprenticeship programs. Copies of the collective 
bargaining agreement, both before and after the changes, are in-
cluded as Appendix C, as a tribute to the influence of title VII and 
the Commission guidelines, which were upheld in the Griggs deci-
sion. 
X. IN THE BEGINNING--AN EXPLANATION 
The concept of rights of strangers is of ancient lineage, reaching 
back to Exodus and Leviticus: 
The stranger that sojourneth with you shall be unto you as the home-
born among you, and thou shall love him as thyself; for ye were 
strangers in the land of Egypt .... 
. . . Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger as 
the homeborn .... 182 
Griggs dealt with such rights in an extraordinary setting, as Dis-
trict Judge Gordon noted. He began his opinion as follows: 
Duke Power Company, the defendant in this action, is a corpora-
tion engaged in the generation, transmission, and distribution of 
electric power .... The thirteen named plaintiffs are all Negroes 
and contend that the defendant has engaged in employment prac-
tices prohibited by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act . . . at 
its Dan River Station located in Draper, North Carolina (recently 
consolidated with the towns of Leaksville and Spray and named 
Eden) •••. 1sa 
182. Leviticus 19:34, 24:22. 
183. 292 F. Supp. at 244 (emphasis added). 
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Commission decision applying testing guidelines of August 24, 
1966, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GumE 1 17,304.53 (EEOC Dec. 2, 1966), 
cited in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971): 
On August 24, 1966, the Commission adopted Guidelines on 
Employment Testing Procedures (1[ 16,904). In light of the Guide-
lines, the Commission concludes that reasonable cause exists to be-
lieve that Respondent's testing procedures are in violation of Title 
VII of the Act. 
The following facts are undisputed. Respondent employs approxi-
mately 2,465 persons in its Mill and Converter Plants . . . . While 
Negroes constitute approximately 40% of [the local] population, they 
constitute 6% of Respondent's work force. Commencing in 1958 
Respondent has administered various tests to applicants for employ-
ment. From the beginning of 1957 through April 1964 Respondent 
hired 386 whites and 12 Negroes; of the Converter plant employees 
hired since then, between April 1964 and November 1965, 75 are 
white and 4 are Negro. 
Most of the jobs at Respondent's plant are in lines of progres-
sion, which means that an employee moves up from a lower paying 
job on the bottom to a higher paying job on the top in accordance 
with seniority, if able to perform the work. Most of the remaining 
jobs, which involve less skilled and more menial work, are lower 
paying "dead end" jobs with no prospect of advancement. Of the 
white employees in the Converter operation, 797 (82%) are in line 
of progression jobs while 177 (18%) are in dead end jobs. Of the 
Negro employees in the Converter operation, 8 (8%) are in line of 
progression jobs while 89 (92%) are in dead end jobs. In 1964 Re-
spondent commenced administering tests to employees desiring to 
move from dead end jobs to line of progression to another. Em-
ployees who were in line of progression jobs were not required to 
take the tests to keep their jobs or to be promoted within lines of 
progression. Since 1964, 94 white employees and 17 Negro employees 
have taken the transfer tests. Of these, 58 whites (58%) and one 
Negro (6%) passed. The one Negro who passed was outbid for the 
job he was seeking by a higher seniority white. 
It is significant that until 1963, shortly before the transfer tests 
were instituted, Respondent maintained segregated jobs and lines of 
progression, so that Negroes were categorically excluded on the 
basis of their race from the more skilled and better paying jobs which 
were reserved for "whites only." While the bars are no longer ex-
pressly in terms of race, it is plain that Respondent's testing proce-
dures have had the effect of continuing the restriction on the en-
trance of Negro employees into "white" line of progression jobs. 
We stated in our Guidelines: "If the facts indicate that an em-
ployer has discriminated in the past on the basis of race . . • the 
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use of tests in such circumstances will be scrutinized carefully by the 
Commission." Accordingly, where, as here, the employer has a his-
tory of excluding Negroes from employment opportunities it is in-
cumbent upon the employer to show affirmatively that the tests them-
selves and the method of their application are non-discriminatory 
within the meaning of Title VII. 
Title VII permits employers to use ability tests which are "profes-
sionally developed" and which are not "designed, intended, or used" 
to discriminate. As we have stated in our Guidelines, to be consid-
ered as "professionally developed," not only must the tests in ques-
tion be devised by a person or firm in the business or profession of 
developing employment tests, but in addition, the tests must be 
developed and applied in accordance with the accepted standards of 
the testing profession. Relevant here are the requirements that the 
tests used be structured in terms of the skills required on the specific 
jobs and that the tests be validated for those specific jobs. In other 
words, before basing personnel actions on test results, it must have 
been determined that those who pass the tests have a greater chance 
for success on the particular jobs in question than those who fail. 
Moreover, where the work force, or potential work force, is multi-
racial, the tests should be validated accordingly. 
In the instant case, all prospective Converter Plant employees are 
required to pass the Otis Employment Test IA or IB. Applicants 
for jobs "requiring mechanical ability" are also required to pass the 
Bennett test of Mechanical Comprehension Form AA and PTI Nu-
merical Test A or B. For transfer, employees are required to pass or 
have passed one or more of the above tests plus the Wonderlic Per-
sonnel Tests Form A. The Otis and Wonderlic tests measure "gen-
eral intelligence," with particular loading on verbal facility; the 
PTI test measures skill in arithmetic; the Bennett test measures 
knowledge of physical principles. There is nothing in the voluminous 
materials submitted by Respondent to indicate that the traits mea-
sured by these tests are traits which are necessary for the successful 
performance of the specific jobs available at Respondent's plant. Nor 
does it appear that any of the tests have been validated properly in 
terms of the specific jobs available at Respondent's plant, or in terms 
of the racial composition of Respondent's work force. In the absence 
of evidence that the tests are properly validated, Respondent has no 
rational basis for believing that employees and applicants who pass 
the tests will make more successful employees than those who fail; 
conversely, Respondent has no rational basis for believing that em-
ployees and applicants who fail the tests would not make successful 
employees. Respondent's testing procedures, therefore, are not "pro-
fessionally developed." Accordingly, since Respondent's testing proce-
dures serve to perpetuate the same pattern of racial discrimination 
which Respondent maintained overtly for many years before it began 
testing, we conclude that there is reasonable cause to believe that 
Respondent, thereby, has violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. 
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APPENDIX B 
Extract from the Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States as Amicus Curiae at 7-9 (footnotes omitted), Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971): 
Moreover, in considering the deference to be accorded the Guide-
lines, it should be recognized that the EEOC has consciously sought 
to construe Title VII "as broadly as possible in order to maximize the 
effect of the statute on employment discrimination without going 
back to Congress for more substantive legislation." In doing so, the 
Commission, "depart[ed] ... from previous notions of what discrimi-
nation is" and, in taking "its interpretation of Title VII a step 
further than other agencies have taken their statute," disregarded 
"intent ... as crucial to the finding of an unlawful employment prac-
tice." In the process of this "creative interpretation" of the law, 
the legislative history of the Act was regarded only an outer limit, 
not a guide, apparently based on the premise that the courts "were 
available to prevent serious error" and might sustain the EEOC's 
interpretation of Title VII, "partly out of deference to the adminis-
trators." 
APPENDIX C 
Extracts from an agreement between a large manufacturing com-
pany and a major industrial union relating to qualifications for par-
ticipation in apprenticeship programs. The provisions of the 1971-
1974 agreement represent a collectively bargained response to the 
Commission guidelines on testing, 'which were upheld in Griggs. 
1968-1971 AGREEMENT 1971-1974 AGREEMENT 
Applicants for apprenticeship shall meet the following requirements: 
1. Not less than eighteen nor more 
than thirty years of age. (Deals with 
citizenship.) 
2. High school graduate or equivalent. 
(In exceptional cases, by mutual local 
agreement between the parties, this 
qualification may be waived if the 
applicant has two or more years of 
high school.) 
3. Satisfactorily pass the company's phy-
sical examination designed to estab-
lish physical ability to work in the 
trade or craft, including 20/20 nor-
mal or corrected vision and color 
determination test. 
1. Not less than eighteen nor more 
than forty years of age. (No provi-
sion re citizenship.) 
2. An applicant who has not success-
fully completed a minimum of eight 
years of elementary education or 
equivalent must demonstrate to the 
joint plant training committee that 
he has the potential to learn the 
particular apprenticeship job for 
which he has bid. 
3. Applicants shall be physically able 
to perform the work of the occu-
pation and training program in• 
volved. In the determination of 
ability and physical fitness the com• 
pany shall use such examinations and 
evaluation procedures as are related 
to the physical and training re• 
quirements of the particular occu• 
pation involved. 
